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Abstract:  I discuss what Aristotle was trying to encode when he said that the object of scientific knowledge is necessary, or 
that what we know (scientifically) cannot be otherwise etc. The paper is meant as a continuation of previous papers—orientated 
towards a book on the Posterior Analytics—and thus does not discuss in much detail key passages, as the very definition of 
scientific knowledge in APo I.2, or passages from APo I.4 and I.6 (for these, I refer to my previous papers). This paper is mainly 
focused on Aristotle’s references to his notion of scientific knowledge both in other passages from the APo and in other treatises. I 
intend to show that there is a progressive, intrinsic relation between the two requirements by which scientific knowledge is 
defined. It is not true that each of these requirements stems from a different source. The Causal-Explanatory requirements gives 
Aristotle the general heading. Then, the Necessity Requirement ranges over the explanatory relation between explanans and 
explanandum and thereby specifies what sort of cause is sctricly required for having scientific knowledge of a given explanandum. 
Now, Aristotle was also concerned with the necessary truth of the elemental predications that constitute a demonstration. My 
claim that the Necessity Requirement ranges over the explanatory relation does not ignore that concern, and does not deny it. My 
claim is that Aristotle’s main focus, and main concern, consists in stressing that the explanatory factor to be captured in 
scientific knowledge of a given explanandum is such that cannot be otherwise.
Keywords:  Demonstration. Necessity. Causality. Essencialism. Explanation. Predication.
We can surely attribute to Aristotle the thesis that the object of  scientific knowledge is 
necessary, as well as the thesis that, in order to attain scientific knowledge of  a given object, one 
must know that that object is necessary. Indeed, formulated on this level of  generality, those 
theses seem to capture what Aristotle has said. However, what do those theses mean exactly? If  
one should paraphrase and develop them, how should they be paraphrased and developed with 
exegetical correctness? 
Let me start with the passage in which Aristotle defines scientific knowledge in the Posterior 
Analytics (henceforth, APo), which runs as follows: 
T1: “We think we have knowledge of  something simpliciter [i] (and not in the sophistical 
way, incidentally), [ii] when we think we know of  the cause because of  which the 
explanandum holds that it is its cause, [iii] and also that it is not possible for it to be 
otherwise” (71b9–12, Barnes’s translation modified). 
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In this paper, I will not address section (i) of  T1, let alone what is meant by the contrast 
between knowing something simpliciter and knowing something in a sophistical way, on the basis 
of  a concomitant factor.  I take T1 to be defining the specific notion of  scientific knowledge, 1
instead of  aiming at the general notion of  knowledge. Sections (ii)-(iii) of  the passage advances 
two requirements in the definiens: scientific knowledge of  X depends on knowing the cause of  X
—and Aristotle emphasizes that what is at stake is to know that that cause is the cause of  X—, 
and depends on knowing that “this” cannot be otherwise. The first requirement is reasonably 
clear. But the second requirement raises two crucial questions: first, what exactly the pronoun 
“this” retrieves; secondly, what does Aristotle exactly mean in stating that this cannot be 
otherwise. Since these two questions are crucial for my purposes, my next step consists in 
examining the second requirement in more detail.  
2. Examining the issue: 
Scientific knowledge of  X (whatever X happens to be) requires these two conditions: 
A. Knowing the cause on the basis of  which X is; 
B. Knowing that this is necessary (i.e., cannot be otherwise). 
(Henceforth, in order to make the references easier, I will employ the expressions 
“Requirement A” and “Requirement B” respectively to refer to these conditions advanced in T1.) 
Requirement B is so generic that there is a bunch of  interpretative options. Now, generality 
does not imply falsity. It is certainly true that you have eaten food in the lunch today. However, if  
someone wants to know exactly what it is that you have eaten (think of  a doctor, or a nutritionist), 
it is not enlightening to answer in that way, “I have eaten food” (or “I have eaten hot food” etc.). 
Similarly, an exact exegesis of  Aristotle’s text must ascertain what is exactly meant with 
Requirement B. 
Most interpretations take the pronoun “this” at 71b12 as referring to “pragma” in Aristotle’s 
text.  But “pragma” can be taken in many ways: it can be taken with the force of  ‘object’ in an 2
abstract and vague way (as opposed to proposition, and covering items so distinct from each other 
 However, the examination of  T16 will lead me to say something about this contrast in T1.1
 See Philoponus 20.29; Ross 1949, p. 507; Porchat 2001, p. 35; Barnes 1993, p. 90-91; McKirahan, 1992, p. 23; 2
Pellegrin, 2005, p. 67; Mignucci 2007, p. 151; Bronstein 2016, p. 36, 51. It is doubtful what exactly Philoponus has 
understood (cf. 20.29-30-4).
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as a natural kind, the Sun, the triangle or god); or it can be taken with the force of  ‘proposition’ or 
‘state of  affairs’, or, in better words and to simplify the point, it can be taken as what is exactly 
encoded in the conclusion of  a demonstrative syllogism (cf. 71b17-19). On the light of  this, there 
are two important options to understand Requirement B (let me call these options ‘B1’ and ‘B2’): 
B1. Knowing that the object is necessary (i.e., cannot be otherwise). 
In this case, requirement B turns out to be equivalent to the condition of  knowing that a 
given object of  scientific knowledge is necessary in the sense that it exists eternally and does not 
change its characteristics over time—for instance, knowing that the abstract object named 
‘triangle’ is eternally as it is, without changing its characteristics over time. 
B2. Knowing that the proposition in question is necessary (—is always true and can never 
become false). 
In this case, requirement B turns out to be equivalent to the condition of  knowing that the 
proposition in question is necessarily true. 
Option B2 is seductive, but—as almost all admit—a little bit embarassing. As I will explore 
in section 5.1.2, there are robust reasons to consider it an embarass, but let me start with the 
reason accepted by (almost) everyone, which is this: for Aristotle himself, such a requirement will 
only be satisfied in a few domains (say, mathematics, cosmology and theology), but will not be 
satisfied exactly in those domains (e.g., biology) in which Aristotle himself  has conducted his most 
successful scientific investigations. Given this embarass, most scholars believe that B2 deserves a 
charitative interpretation, which ends up in the following, attenuated option:    3
B2*. knowing that the proposition in question is necessarily true or (in the domains in which 
necessity fails) true for the most part.  
 See Ferejohn 2013, p. 82; Bronstein 2016, p. 36, n29; Mignucci 2007, p. 238; Barnes 1993, p. 92, 192. Indeed, 3
there is some plausible justification for applying the principle of  caritativeness. But see further ahead the distinction 
between the questions Q1 and Q2. Mignucci 1981 has argued in favour of  taking the ‘for the most part’ propositions 
as equivalent to necessary (and eternal) propositions. Against this, see Judson 1991, p. 87-89. 
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Before discussing B2*, let me note that there is still a different option for interpreting 
Aristotle’s point. The pronoun “this” (“τοῦτο”, 71b12) can be taken as referring to the previous 
sentence in Aristotle’s text, namely, “that [its cause] is the cause of  that” (in Greek, ὅτι ἐκείνου 
αἰτία ἐστι, where “ἐκείνου” refers to “pragma”).  In this case, what Aristotle is trying to encode in 4
Requirement B is something different from the previous options: what cannot be otherwise is the 
explanatory relation between the explanandum and its explanans—i.e., the relation between the 
cause and the state of  affairs it explains.  
However, this move still results in a generic option, for the nature of  the relation that 
cannot be otherwise can still be specified in many different ways. To avoid confusion, I say in 
advance that I will argue for option B5 below. But a careful consideration of  the available options 
is in order, even if  just for the sake of  exhausting the possible scenarios. Thus, I examine step by 
step other possible options for taking the referent of  the pronoun “τοῦτο” as the relation between 
pragma and cause. Thus, the following options (B3-B5) can still be conceived:  
B3. knowing that the relation between the cause and its pragma cannot be otherwise in the 
(logical) sense that it is a relation of  necessary consequence. 
In other words: given the cause as the content of  the premises (in a scientific syllogism or 
whatever), the conclusion that expresses the pragma follows necessarily.  
B4. knowing that the relation between the cause and its pragma cannot be otherwise in the 
(metaphysical) sense that, if  the cause obtains (as an objective state of  affairs in the world), it is 
not possible for the pragma (of  which that cause is the cause) to fail in obtaining. 
In other words, this option B4 takes the cause as an item that necessitates the occurrence of  
the pragma from a metaphysical standpoint. 
 Objecting that “τοῦτο” can only refer to “πρᾶγμα” for (supposed) “grammatical reasons” is so wrong that I am 4
surprised to find this objection regularly in scholarly discussions. Pronouns can take up whole sentences or 
propositions—not only in Greek, but in English and many other languages. If  a list of  cases in Aristotle is needed (to 
my surprise), see An. Post. 94a33; Top. 101b2; Gen. An. 716a7, 13; 735a18; 744a11; 747a32; 758b19; 786b19; 732a16; 
766a34; 768b12; 783a14; 784b14. For discussion of  this point in T1, see Angioni 2009a, p. 67, n14; 2012a, p. 44, 
n72. To my knowledge, the only scholar to have flirted with this option—but in a footnote, almost as an aside—was 
Lloyd 1981, p. 157, n2.
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B5. knowing that the relation between the cause and its pragma cannot be otherwise in the 
(explanatory) sense that it is exactly that cause (not any other cause) that appropriately explains 
the pragma in question (but not a different pragma). 
In this case, the relation between the cause and its pragma is not being highlighted as a 
relation of  logical consequence (even if  it involves, indeed, a relation of  logical consequence), nor 
as a relation of  metaphysical necessitation (even if  it is, indeed, a relation of  this sort). Of  course, 
option B5 has corollaries in the domains of  logic and metaphysics. But B5 takes Aristotle to be 
focusing in an explanatory requirement. In order to have scientific knowledge of  a given pragma, 
what is required is the knowledge of  this, appropriate cause (not any other cause).  5
3. Two Distinct Questions: 
It is of  utmost importance for my purposes to insist in the distinction between two different 
questions. Henceforth, these two questions will be referred to as Q1 and Q2 respectively: 
Q1. What propositions, from those involved in B1-B5, are taken as true by Aristotle in the 
Posterior Analytics (or even in his work as a whole)? 
Q2. Which one—among those propositions involved in B1-B5—the definition of  scientific 
knowledge in 71b9-12 (T1) is meant to encode and express? 
To make the distinction clearer, let us take B1. One question is Q1: “is it true for Aristotle 
that the object of  scientific knowledge must be something that necessarily exists?”. Another 
question is Q2: “does the requirement that the object of  scientific knowledge must be something 
that necessarily exists correspond to what Aristotle has exactly meant to encode in T1?”. Let us 
take B3, in turn. One question is Q1: “is it true for Aristotle that the logical relation between 
explanans and explanandum is a relation of  necessary consequence?”. Another question is Q2: 
“does the requirement that the logical relation between explanans and explanandum be a 
relation of  necessary consequence correspond to what Aristotle has exactly meant to encode in 
T1?”. 
 Perhaps the sentence “ὅτι ἐκείνου αἰτία ἐστι” (which is what the pronoun “this” refers to) might be translated in a 5
more enlightening way: “that it is of  this that the cause is the cause”. I thank Adam Crager, Tim Clarke and Ben 
Morison for discussions that helped me to clarify the point. See Ribeiro 2014, p. 147-152, 156.
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Now, a conflation between questions Q1 and Q2 can be a disaster for the exegesis of  
Aristotle’s text. The two questions are distinct from each other, even if  related to each other in 
important ways. It is clear that any definiens must have true content—at least, a content that 
Aristotle himself  takes to be true. Thus, it is clear that any positive answer for Q2 must entail a 
positive answer for Q1. But—importantly—not vice-versa. The two questions are really distinct 
from each other. For any definiendum X, its definition need not encapsulate all that is true about 
X. For instance, the definition of  human being need not contain every truth about human beings, 
and does not even need to state that human beings are mammals, or animals capable of  smiling 
etc. The situation is not different, when the X to be defined is scientific knowledge (as it is in T1). 
This is important because, in saying that being mammal need not be included in the definition of  
human being, one is not thereby denying that human beings are mammals. In the same way, in 
denying that (e.g.) B3 is not included in the definition of  scientific knowledge, one is not thereby 
denying that B3 is (or might be) true for Aristotle. 
On the light of  these distinctions, I give a preliminary map for the ensuing discussion. Let 
me start with Q1, which must be cashed out in terms of  asking whether Aristotle has indeed 
considered B1-B5 as conditions for scientific knowledge. For the traditional interpretation, 
Aristotle takes as true requirements B1, B2 (as well as B2*, which follows from B2), B3 and, 
perhaps, B4. Actually, there can be more subtleties about B4, which I will not discuss.  My 6
purpose in this paper consists in stressing that traditional interpretations have not even dreamed 
of  B5 as an option—not even in the domain of  question Q1. On my part, I stress that, in the 
domain of  question Q1, conditions B3, B4 and B5 are taken as true by Aristotle, but B1 and B2 
are false. Given that discussing B1 is not important for my purposes here, I stress that B2 is, stricly 
speaking, false and should be replaced with B2*. So much for question Q1.  
Let us now consider question Q2, which focuses strictly on what Aristotle has encoded in 
the definition of  scientific knowledge in T1. Almost all scholars think that Requirement B in T1 
must be understood in terms of  B2 or (on the light of  other texts) B2*. On my part, I argue that 
Requirement B must be understood in terms of  B5. What Aristotle has attempted to encode in 
his definition of  scientific knowledge in T1 was a requirement about explanatory adequacy.  
 For instance: material causes, or even some final causes, do not satisfy B4.6
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However, before developing my answer to question Q2, I stress two points of  utmost 
importance to understand what exactly I am proposing. 
First, confusion about the exact nature of  what is being defined in 71b9-12 (T1) might raise 
resistance against B5—as an answer to either Q1 or Q2. Many scholars believe that what 
Aristotle wants to define in T1 is scientific understanding, as “understanding” is taken in some 
contemporary epistemological discussions, namely, as the mastery over a body of  propositions 
systematized as a scientific discipline.  In this picture, Requirements A and B are taken as 7
conditions that anyone must satisfy to be considered an expert mastering a given discipline (e.g., a 
geometer). Now, I believe that Aristotle is also interested in such questions as what determines an 
expertise, what makes a body of  propositions a scientific discipline etc. However, his exact focus 
in T1 is different. Aristotle is defining, in T1, what it is to have scientific knowledge of  each thing, 
namely, of  a given explanandum in a given domain. (More on this below). Requirements A and B 
state conditions that must be satisfied to have scientific knowledge of  a given explanandum within 
a given discipline (e.g., to have scientific knowledge of  2R as an attribute of  triangles). 
It is important to stress that the two questions implied in the last paragraph are indeed 
different questions—even if  they are intrinsically inter-related. We may ask: (1) “when [i.e., on 
what conditions] has a geometer attained the ultimate explanation of  a given theorem?”, but this is 
different from asking: (2) “when [i.e., on what conditions] has someone attained full mastery over the 
discipline as a whole?”. Of  course, having scientific knowledge of  a given theorem requires some 
mastery of  the discipline, as well as, conversely, having full mastery over the discipline as a whole 
requires sistematic knowledge of  a significant number of  theorems. However, even so, specific 
requirements applying to the first question are different from specific requirements applying to 
the second question. As we know, being different from does not imply being independent from.  8
Now, my contention is that—although Aristotle is concerned with both questions at large—what 
Aristotle is attempting to define in T1 is the former question, namely, what it is to have scientific 
knowledge of  a specific explanandum within a given discipline. Now, resistance against B5 might stem 
 See Burnyeat 1981; Burnyeat 2011, p. 19; Lesher 2001. On “systematic knowledge”, see Charlton 1992, p. 1; 7
Broadie & Rowe 2002, p. 365. For discussion, see Bronstein 2016, p. 36.
 For instance: the requirement that the terms of  an appropriate demonstration be coextensive with each other 8
applies to having scientific knowledge of  a given explanandum (as I argued for in Angioni 2018, p. 178-182), but does 
not apply indifferently to every proposition that constitutes a discipline —for in this discipline there will be several 
other items, such as “application arguments” (borrowing the terminology from McKirahan 1992, p. 177-187), and 
several other propositions, in which the terms need not be coextensive.
Page  of 7 56
from the opinion that it is a requirement too strong (or even inadequate) for scientific knowledge 
taken as the full mastery over a discipline. If  Aristotle’s requirement is taken in this way, the 
resistance will be on the right track, for the full mastery over a discipline requires mastering over 
several propositions and deductive procedures that go beyond the causes which are exactly 
appropriate to each explanandum. However, B5 is not a requirement for knowing every item 
involved in the systematic mastery of  a discipline. B5 is a requirement for the scientific knowledge 
of  a given explanandum—for this is what Aristotle targets in T1: scientific knowledge of  a given, 
specific explanandum within a discipline. 
Second, my claim in favour of  B5 sometimes finds resistance because one precipitately 
believe that B5 implies getting rid of  B2 and B2*, as if  I were claiming that B2* itself  is a false 
requirement. To be clear: I reject requirement B2 as false—and in this I am not alone.  However, 9
my claim in favour of  B5 (which I take to satisfy both questions Q1 and Q2) is far from being 
incompatible with accepting B2* as a satisfactory answer for Q1, which is tantamount to saying 
that the propositional content of  B2* is itself  true, even if  it is not what Aristotle is expressing in 
T1. Thus, for Aristotle, having scientific knowledge of  a given proposition (taken as an 
explanandum within a given discipline) surely involves knowing that the proposition at stake is 
true necessarily or for the most part. However, the crucial difficulty consists in ascertaining 
whether Aristotle’s definition of  scientific knowledge in T1 (71b9-12) is expressing B2* or not. I 
insist, therefore, in the distinction between questions Q1 and Q2. For it is perfectly possible for a 
given thesis, as B2*, to be true on Aristotle’s eyes but not to have been expressed in T1—as it is 
perfectly possible that what delivers a positive answer to Q1 does not deliver a positive answer to 
Q2. At last, I stress that B5, far from being incompatible with B2* in general, can even be taken 
as entailing B2*. B5 ranges over the explanatory relation between explanans and explanandum. 
Now, once this is settled, it is possible to ask what requirements apply to the elemental 
propositions that express respectively the explanans and the explanandum—or, in other words, 
what requirements apply to each of  the predications themselves (premises and conclusions) that 
constitute a demonstration. Thus, one can ask: must the propositions expressing the explanans 
and the explanandum be themselves necessarily true or at least true for the most part? Even if  we 
answer “yes”, and I do, this answer does not prove that B2* is the correct answer for question Q2. 
 See Barnes 1993, p. 92-93; Ferejohn 2013, p. 82; Bronstein 2016, p. 36, n29.9
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The correct answer for Q2 is B5, which entails B2* as a correct answer for Q1, and this has 
naturally misled readers.  
4. The necessity requirement as explanatory appropriateness (B5): 
I start now the discussion of  Q2: among the propositions involved in B1-B5 (i.e., among the 
five options to understand the requirement B in T1), which of  them is the target of  the definition 
of  scientific knowledge? Or, in other words: which of  them is the definition of  scientific 
knowledge in T1 meant to encode? 
Options B1, B2, B3 and B4 can surely be discarded as answers for question Q2—they have 
been considered in my survey only to map the terrain in an exhaustive way. Indeed, B1 implies 
B2 or even collapses into B2 at least in the domain of  question Q2. For, in the domain of  
scientific knowledge, propositions that define an object X or ascribe characteristics to the object X 
play the most important role, so that the proposition that X exists can be taken somehow as a 
background presupposition.  Furthermore, X’s existence is treated from the standpoint of  10
scientific knowledge mainly (or exclusively) when analysed in terms of  a characteristic attribute 
occurring in a given subject—for instance, thunder’s existence is treated in terms of  a certain 
kind of  noise occurring in the clouds. Consequently, sentences such as “X necessarily exists” 
collapse—and should be carefully analysed—into predicative sentences, like “P necessarily holds 
of  S”, “P necessarily holds of  X” or “X necessarily holds of  S”.  11
B3 can also be discarded. Aristotle surely requires that the relation between the cause and 
its pragma be expressed as a sound syllogistic deduction, in which true premises expressing the 
causal relations entail the truth of  the conclusion. However, this requirement (about the 
expression of  the logical necessity) is not what he has encoded in T1. As we know, Aristotle is far 
from reducing the notion of  scientific knowledge (and, more particularly, the notion of  scientific 
demonstration) to the notion of  sound deduction.  12
 On presuppositions in the domain of  a scientific discipline, cf. 76b16-19.10
 See 89b37ss. I need not go into details. I have dealt with this issue in Angioni 2014b, p. 86-88. See Almeida 2017. I 11
disagree with the interpretation that take the hypotheseis (defined in 72a18-24) as existence statement of  the form “S 
exists”. For discussion, see Gomez-Lobo 1977, Charles 2000, p. 197-220, and Barnes 1996.
 For discussion, see Angioni 2014b, p. 64-68. Among other passages, the most intuitive to clarify this point is 12
Posterior Analytics 78a26-b4. I will allude to B3 again when discussing T14.
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B4 can also be easily discarded as an answer for question Q2. Aristotle surely believes that 
the cause (at least in some important domains) is so that metaphysically necessitates the 
occurrence of  its pragma. Nonetheless, he was not targeting this point in T1. Strictly speaking, 
Aristotle is committed to a stronger thesis: that the cause and its pragma are metaphysically 
correlated, and that their linguistic expressions (properly elaborated) are coextensive or co-
entailing (cf. 78b13-28, II.16, 98a35ss.).  Even so, Aristotle is far from reducing the notion of  an 13
appropriate cause to the condition of  mutually entailing its pragma. 
It results that, in order to map the answers to question Q2, the most important point is the 
following: whereas traditional interpretations believe that the definition in T1 expresses the 
Requirements A and B2 (or B2*) , I argue that the definition in T1 expresses Requirements A 14
and B5. However, I stress the importance of  the distinction between Q1 and Q2. Thus, my claim 
that the definition in T1 expresses Requirements A and B5 as answers to Q2 is perfectly 
compatible with accepting that B2* is true in the range of  Q1. Thus, I stress that my 
interpretation takes B2* itself  as true: scientific knowledge of  X requires knowing propositions 
about X that are necessarily or for the most part true, and requires (more strongly) knowing that 
propositions about X are true necessarily or for the most part. However, even so, B2* is not part 
of  the content expressed by Aristotle in his definition of  scientific knowledge in T1. The 
definition advances Requirement B5, which concerns the explanatory appropriateness of  the 
cause to be selected as explanatory factor. 
Now, my reader might be annoyed with the fact that I have so far avoided the (presumed) 
“strong evidence” that favours the traditional interpretation in terms of  B2 or B2*—the evidence 
presumably found at the beginning of  APo I.4 (73a21-24) and chapter I.6 as a whole. I have 
discussed most of  those key passages elsewhere.  This present paper is mostly concerned with 15
addressing other passages in which Aristotle refers to his notion of  scientific knowledge, besides 
those in the APo which presumably favours options B2 and B2*. Even so, I will explain how I 
understand those key passages that seem to favour the traditional interpretation (Section 5.a.1) 
 For details, see Angioni 2018, p. 163-177; Zuppolini 2018b, p. 230-240.13
 See, e.g., Barnes 1993, p. 90-91; McKirahan 1992, p. 22-23; Mignucci 2007, p. 151, 162-3; Ferejohn 2013, p. 82; 14
Bronstein 2016, p. 36, 43; Mendelsohn 2019, p. 102-3.
 See Angioni 2014a; Angioni 2016, p. 100-102; Angioni 2013a, p. 262ss.; Angioni 2019.15
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5. Aristotle’s own references to his notion of  scientific knowledge:  
Aristotle’s treatises, the APo included, have several references to his definition of  scientific 
knowledge. Do these references (or allusions) favour one of  the options for understanding 
Requirement B in T1? The underlying issue (from the previous section of  this paper) consists in 
identifying what requirements have been exactly encoded in Aristotle’s definition of  scientific 
knowledge—i.e., question Q2, but not question Q1. On this light, the new issue I have just 
formulated amounts to examining how Aristotle’s own references to his definition of  scientific 
knowledge contribute to answer question Q2.  
 First, I will argue that Aristotle’s references to his definition of  scientific knowledge within 
the APo confirm the interpretation in terms of  B5. These references are divided into two groups: 
on the one hand, those that appear to refer to B2 (or B2*), but, on closer examination, show that 
the notion of  explanatory appropriateness is at stake and thereby favour the interpretation in 
terms of  B5; on the other hand, those that explicitly refer to Requirement A with no allusion to 
Requirement B at all. I will be brief  about the first group of  these references, for I have dealt with 
them in previous papers—and, unfortunately, a detailed discussion of  chapter I.6 as a whole does 
not fit this paper (I would need fifty pages more!).  
Secondly, I will highlight a fact about Aristotle’s references outside the APo and discuss its 
significance. The fact is that several (or even most) references to Aristotle’s notion of  scientific 
knowledge as officially defined in T1 does not mention Requirement B, but only refers to 
Requirement A. There are two important exceptions, which are usually employed as evidence for 
the traditional interpretation: Ethica Nicomachea VI.1-3, Metaphysics VII.15.  Now, it would be too 16
long to examine the Metaphysics passage in this paper, for a satisfactory tracking of  the argument 
(which is a discussion against some version of  the Theory of  Forms) would lead us far away. 
Besides, and most importantly, all Aristotle says in Metaphysics VII.15 involves the distinction 
between scientific knowledge and opinion in such a way that can receive the same treatment as 
APo I.33. The distinction appears to hinge on a modal difference, as if  the object of  scientific 
knowledge were necessary predications and as if  the object of  opinion were restricted to 
contingent things. Now, I have already developed my view about the distinction between scientific 
 Actually, the passages I am concerned with (1139a6-8, b18-35) belong to the common books of  Nicomachean and 16
Eudemian Ethics. But it is immaterial to my purposes here to discuss whether these passages originally belong to the 
Nicomachean or to the Eudemian Ethics. Just to make references easier, I will refer to them as Ethica Nicomachea VI, but 
nothing important hinges on that conventional way of  referring to the passage.
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knowledge and opinion in APo I.33. Since I believe that Metaphysics VII.15 can be treated in the 
same way as APo I.33, I will not discuss it in this paper.  17
5.a) Aristotle’s references to his notion of  scientific knowledge within the 
Posterior Analytics: 
5.a.1) What might seem evidence for B2* (or B2) confirms B5: 
In APo I.4, 73a21-24, Aristotle resumes what I have labelled Requirement B: “that of  which 
there is scientific knowledge simpliciter cannot be otherwise” (see a similar sentence in 71b15-16), 
and a few lines further ahead, he concludes:  
T2: “what is known with demonstrative knowledge is necessary. Demonstrative is 
the knowledge we have by having demonstrations. Thus, a demonstration is a syllogism 
that depends on [or proceed from] necessary items”. (73a22-24) 
The first sentence of  T2 is as general and vague as the formulation found in T1. The 
traditional interpretation has been precipitate in taken T2 as decisive evidence for understanding 
T1 in terms of  B2.  Option B2 relies on the assumption that “what is known with demonstrative 18
knowledge” refers exclusively to the conclusion of  a demonstration. Thus, T2 is taken to be 
reasoning from the “definitional” fact that the conclusion must be necessarily true (in terms of  
B2) to the result that the premises must also be necessarily true. Besides other problems—such as 
the clash with Aristotle’s theory of  modal syllogisms, as well as the same false results that stems 
from T4 (which I will explore below)— this interpretation of  T2 is problematic because it takes 
its assumption as being the only option. But it is not. Now, the important question is this: what 
does the expression “what is known with demonstrative knowledge” refer to? Predications playing 
the role of  conclusion are far from being the only option. What we know, when we acquire 
demonstrative knowledge of  the 2R theorem (or of  the lunar eclipse), is a highly complex 
explanatory relation between the explanandum and the explanans, which Aristotle wants to be 
 See Angioni 2019, Angioni 2013a, p. 262-4. For different views on I.33, see Fine 2010; Moss & Schwab (2019); 17
Morison (forth.); Peramatzis (forth.).
 See Filopono 57.22-29, 58.18-19; Barnes 1993, p. 110-11; Barnes 1993b, p. 230; McKirahan 1992, p. 81-83; 18
Mignucci 2007, p.162-3. See also Ferejohn 2013, p. 82, in favour of  B2*. Ross 1949, p. 526 is neuter on this, for he 
repeats Aristotle’s words with the same vagueness and generality. Porchat 2001, p. 137, seems to embrace B1 e B2 at 
once.
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parsed as a relation between the conclusion and the premises of  the demonstrative syllogism.  19
Thus, merely necessary predications (in which the predicative tie is necessarily true) are far from 
being thereby qualified for the role of  “necessary items on which demonstrative knowledge 
depends”. The necessary items (i.e., principles) on which demonstrative knowledge depends are 
premises that, being true necessarily or for the most part, are here called “necessary” in terms of  
B5: they are the necessary ones for the most appropriate explanation of  the explanandum in 
question. The fact that being necessary in terms of  B5 requires predications that are necessary or 
for the most part true in terms of  B2* does not modify the story.   
Further ahead in the APo, chapter I.6 is completely devoted to exploring the thesis 
announced in I.4 (T2), namely, that “demonstration is a syllogism that depends on [or proceeds 
from] necessary items”. The two most important passages are the following: 
T3: “Given that demonstrative knowledge depends on [or proceeds from] 
necessary principles, and given that necessary are the attributes that apply to the things 
[sc. the explananda] in themselves […], it is clear that a demonstrative syllogism depends 
on [or proceeds from] items of  this kind; for everything applies either in this way or on 
the basis of  a concomitant factor, but concomitant factors are not necessary” (74b5-13). 
T4: “If  something has been demonstrated, it is not possible for it to be otherwise; 
therefore, the syllogism must proceed from necessary [items], for from true [items] you 
can deduce without demonstrating, but from necessary [items] you cannot deduce 
without demonstrating—this is precisely the mark of  demonstration”. (74b14-18). 
There are two main reasons why it is embarassing to understand the Necessity 
Requirement in T1 in terms of  B2. The first reason—which is actually less important—is that, by 
Requirement B2, only a few disciplines, such as mathematics, cosmology and theology, will 
deserve the title of  “scientific knowledge”, whereas the disciplines which Aristotle himself  has 
developed, like several branches of  biology, will not deserve that title. The traditional 
interpretation tries to get rid of  this trouble through a speculative hypothesis that has no textual 
evidence, namely, that Aristotle would have changed his mind when developing his explorations 
 I have developed this view with more details in Angioni 2019, p. 173-5, 191-5.19
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in the field of  biology etc., leaving aside the exaggerated requirements found in the APo.  (The 20
only presumed evidence for this fictitious narrative is APo I.30, which I will discuss further ahead). 
Much more important is the second reason why it is embarassing to understand the 
Necessity Requirement in T1 in terms B2—for the second reason also affects B2*, which is the 
traditional way of  dealing with the difficulty involved in the first reason. If  understood in terms 
of  B2, passage T4 would be saying that any sound deduction with necessary propositions (e.g., any sound 
Barbara-syllogism with premises and conclusion necessarily true) would count as a 
demonstration. Understood in terms of  condition B2*, passage T4 would be saying that any sound 
deduction with propositions that are true (at least) for the most part would count as a demonstration. 
However, there is a significant set of  passages with robust evidence against these interpretations, 
namely, against reducing demonstrations to sound deductions with propositions that are 
necessarily true or (at least) true for the most part.  In contrast, if  T4 be understood in terms of  21
B5, there is a perfect harmony in the way Aristotle conducts his discussion in order to flesh out 
with more accurate detail what has been briefly encoded in the definition of  scientific knowledge 
in T1. 
I will be brief  on this point here, because I have already dealt with it in detail.  The robust 22
evidence against the Reduction—and, consequently, against the interpretation of  the Necessity 
Requirement in terms of  B2 or B2*—is fundamentally found in chapters I.5 and I.9, in passages 
that clearly resume the terms in which the definiendum was phrased in T1, namely, “knowing 
each thing simpliciter”, which is tantamount to knowing each thing (within a scientific discipline) 
in the specific way that counts as scientific knowledge. Thus, in 74a32ff., Aristotle is clearly 
concerned with specifying more fine-grained criteria to discern “when one knows simpliciter”—
 This is the style found in LeBlond 1939; there is also a flirt with that suggestion in Barnes 1993, p. 192. In a 20
different style, see also Smith 2009, p. 60, who believes that T4 works with another definition of  demonstration, 
different from T1.
 About the falsity of  such a reduction, see Barnes 1993, p. 126; Mignucci 2007, 171; Hankinson 1998, 161; 21
Angioni 2014a, p. 90-92. The robust set of  evidence against that reduction includes the six requirements for the 
premises in 71b20-32, the insistence on per se predications (73b16-18, 75a29-31), the requirement for principles that 
are suggenes (75b3-12, 76a8-9, 29-30) and appropriate to their explananda (71b22-23, 72a5-6, 74b25-26, 75b36-40, 
76a4-7). It is surprising that most interpretations (following Ross 1949) do not have any comments on T4 (or have 
paltry ones, as Philoponus, 84.18-34). Some suppose that Aristotle has in mind a mysterious equivalence between 
necessary predication and per se predication (cf. Barnes 1970, p. 139-140: “the Posterior Analytics states that holding ‘in 
itself ’ and holding necessarily are equivalent (A 74b5-12)”. But this trick is far from solving the problem, as I have 
shown in Angioni 2016, p. 156-63, and Angioni 2019, p. 200-2.
 I discussed this issue focused on T4 in Angioni 2014a and Angioni 2019, p. 175-191. See also Angioni 2016, p. 22
100-102; Angioni 2012a, p. 44-47.
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more particularly, “when one knows simpliciter why the attibute 2R is attributed to that to which 
it is properly attributed”. There is an important motive for Aristotle to be concerned with refining 
these criteria. Sometimes an attempted demonstration which fails at delivering “knowledge 
simpliciter” gets unnoticed as the failure it is. Such an attempted demonstration satisfies some 
important conditions (being, for instance, a sound deduction of  its conclusion) but do not 
demonstrate in the most appropriate way what was targeted as demonstrandum (74a4-6). In 
chapter I.9, 76a26-30, Aristotle comes back to the same issue: 
T5: “It is difficult to tell whether you have [scientific] knowledge of  something or 
not, for it is difficult to tell whether or not our knowledge of  something proceeds from its 
principles—and this is what it is to know something. We think we have scientific 
knowledge of  something if  we possess a syllogism from some true and primary items, but 
this is not so” (76a26-30). 
T5 is the final section of  chapter I.9, in which Aristotle has discussed more fine-grained 
criteria to tell when (i.e., on what conditions) do we really have scientific knowledge of  a given 
explanandum. In the beginning of  the chapter, he has said: “it is not possible to demonstrate 
each thing unless from the principles of  each one […]” (75a37-38). The requirement of  
demonstrating each thing from the principles of  each one (qua each one is exactly itself) is exactly 
the same requirement of  explanatory appropriateness which, in T1, is encoded in the conditions 
A and B5 (and, besides, is expanded into the six requirements for the premises, cf. 71b22-23). 
Further ahead in the same chapter I.9, the reference to T1 is even more explicit: “We have 
scientific knowledge of  each thing not on the basis of  a concomitant factor when we know it on 
the basis of  that in virtue of  which it is [what it is], from the principles of  that thing qua 
itself ” (76a4-6). 
All the passages from I.5 and I.9 I have been considering are extremely dense.  Now, all of  23
them make clear Aristotle’s concern with specifying in a more fine-grained way the conditions to 
tell that one has attained scientific knowledge of  a given explanandum X—and Aristotle’s target 
 Unfortunately, these passages have not received the attention they deserve. Chapter I.5 has had a better luck, with 23
Ferejohn 2013 and Hasper 2006. The commentaries on I.9 found in Barnes 1993 amount to less than three pages (p. 
134-7), and there is no specific discussion for T5 (76a26-30), which is a passage of  utmost importance. The same 
happened with Ross 1949, p. 535-7, who, besides, has erroneously taken I.9 as a mere warning against the metabasis 
eis ello genos (about the metabasis, see Steinkrüger 2018). No passage from I.5 and I.9 is devoted to a full examination in 
McKirahan 1992, nor in Bronstein 2016 (who at least says something on 76a4-6 in note 21, p. 56).
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is not limited to the more general conditions to tell that someone is an expert in a given domain. 
Aristotle’s strategies to satisfy that concern have several fronts. He insists that the terms in an 
appropriate demonstration must be coextensive with each other (74a1-3), but he also insists in 
intensional aspects stemming from the notion of  per se predication (73b26-39; 74a25-32).  He 24
identifies the risk of  erroneous understanding of  some of  the six requirements he has laid down 
in 71b20-33, as the requirement of  selecting primary and indemonstrable premises (75b37-40, 
76a26-30).  Now, the crucial point for the more fine-grained specification of  this requirement 25
consists in the notion of  explanatory appropriateness: the cause or principle to attain the 
scientific demonstration of X must take X exactly as being X (or qua X). 
One might say that Aristotle seems concentrated on the condition A when refining these 
requirements. But I argue that his effort in refining his requirements paying attention to the 
notion of  explanatory appropriateness, in T3-T4 (as well as other passages from I.5-6 and I.9), is 
better understood as an effort to clarify how the Necessity Requirement in T1 must be taken.  26
And it is especially T4 that confirms that Requirement B must be understood in terms of  B5, 
namely, in terms of  explanatory appropriateness. Option B5 says that the cause to be selected in 
the scientific demonstration of  X is such that it could not have been a different one. What must be 
selected in the scientific demonstration of  X is that cause which, taking X exactly as X, explains in 
the most appropriate way why X is what it is. For this reason, that cause may receive the title of  
“necessary principle”, namely, the principle that is explanatory necessary for the scientific 
explanation of  X—the principle that could not have been a different one. Taken in this way, T4 
does not generate any false, embarassing claim, but delivers instead a claim that is perfectly 
consistent with many passages from the APo.  27
 See Angioni 2016, p. 95-102; Ferejohn 2013, p. 81-90; Hasper 2006; Zuppolini 2018a, p. 129-132.24
 On this point, see Angioni 2012a, p. 42-52. For a different view, ver Ferejohn 2013, p. 72-74.25
 See Angioni 2014a, Angioni 2016, p. 100-102. Moreover, my interpretation allows us to take T1 as a programme 26
that ties together most of  the discussions actually found in the following chapters. Thus, discussions about the per se 
attributes (I.4-6), coextensiveness between the terms in the demonstrative syllogism (I.4-5, I.13), necessary principles 
(I.6), metabasis eis allo genos (I.7), explanatory inadequacy of  too generic principles that apply in common to different 
explananda (I.9), primary causes (I.13)—all this can be understood as a fine-grained cashing out of  the 
Requirements A and B. For the other interpretations, the relations between many of  those discussions is much more 
obscure, sometimes are taken to be rhapsodic. Ferejohn 2013, p. 65-66, 72, has acknowleged the lack of  relation, but 
he attempts to mitigate it by proposing a division of  work between I.1-3 (general conditions for any epistemology) 
and I.4 onwards (Aristotle’s specific philosophy of  science). 
 See references on note 21.27
Page  of 16 56
Thus, in saying that scientific demonstrations depend on “necessary principles” in T3 
(74b5-6), Aristotle is not saying that scientific demonstrations stem from necessary predications 
(i.e., predications in which the predicative tie necessarily holds)—even if  it is true to say that the 
proposition playing the role of  explanatory principle for a given conclusion is, itself, necessarily 
true. What Aristotle encodes in the expression “necessary principles” in 74b5-6 (T3) is the claim 
that a scientific demonstration depends on a proposition that (being itself  necessarily true or at 
least true for the most part) is the principle which is explanatorily necessary, i.e., the principle 
required to explain in the most appropriate way why X is as it is. The adjective “necessary” in 
74b5-6 (T3), which ranges over the noun “principle”, takes the principle exactly as a principle and 
tells something about its explanatory power. Something similar happens with the occurrences of  
the adjective “necessary” (with no noun explicitly attached to it) in T2 and T4. Thus, when 
Aristotle says that a scientific demonstration depends on (or proceeds from) “necessary items”, his 
focus is not to encode the condition that a demonstration must proceed from premises that are 
necessarily true (or at least true for the most part)—even if  this condition is true in itself, for, as I 
have emphasised, B2* delivers a positive answer for the question Q1. What Aristotle expresses, in 
T2 and T4, is the claim that a scientific demonstration depends on (and stems from) premises 
that turn out to be the principles without which the fully appropriate explanation of  the 
explanandum in question is not attained.  28
The points made in the previous paragraphs must be emphasised to discuss a crucial text, 
APo I.30, which supposedly would give support for taking the Necessity Requirement in T1 in 
terms of  B2*. I stress, again, the importance of  the distinction between the questions Q1 and 
Q2. The thesis that Aristotle advances in I.30, and which is confirmed in many other passages, is 
that “there is no scientific (or demonstrative) knowledge of  what happens by chance” (87b19).  29
Aristotle’s argument is simple: “what happens by chance is not either necessary or for the most 
part, but is what happens apart from these two; demonstration, however, is about one of  these 
two” (87b20-22). It is also true that, further ahead in I.30, modal terminology seems to be 
applied exactly to the predicative relations encoded in each sentence of  a demonstration, instead 
of  applying to the explanatory relation between premises and conclusion. The text reads thus: 
 For details, see Angioni 2019, p. 179-191; Angioni 2014a, p. 91-103; Angioni 2016, p. 100-102; Angioni, 2012a p. 28
44-47.
 Cf. Metaphysics 1027a19-26; Physics 197a8-21. For excellent discussion, see Judson 1991.29
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“every syllogism proceeds from necessary premises, or from ‘for the most part’ premises; if  the 
premises are necessary, the conclusion is necessary too; but, if  the premises are ‘for the most part’, 
the conclusion will be of  this kind too” (87b22-5, my italics).  
Now, this passage gives support in favour of  option B2* only in the domain of  question Q1
—but not in the domain of  question Q2. Thus, it is true that, for Aristotle, scientific knowledge 
requires knowing that the propositions at stake are true necessarily or for the most part.  30
However, this does not prove that the Necessity Requirement in the definition of  scientific 
knowledge in T1 must be understood in terms of  B2*. As I have already argued, if  the Necessity 
Requirement were understood in terms of  B2 in T3-T4, Aristotle would be embracing a thesis 
that he himself  takes to be false and, besides, is inconsistent with a significant part of  the 
discussions developed in the APo—namely, the thesis that any sound deduction with necessarily 
true propositions would count as a scientific demonstration.  This trouble would not be solved if  31
B2 gets replaced with B2*. Strictly speaking, B2* would deliver a thesis even more bizarre in T4, 
namely, the thesis that any sound deduction with ‘quasi-necessary’ propositions (i.e., propositions 
that are true for the most part, but not necessarily) would count as a scientific demonstration.   32
Thus, the distinction between questions Q1 and Q2 is fundamental to understand 
Aristotle’s theory of  scientific knowledge. It is surely true that, for Aristotle, “every scientific 
knowledge is about that which holds necessarily or that which holds for the most 
part” (1027a20-21). This amounts to saying that the proposition underlying B2* is true — B2* 
delivers a positive answer to question Q1. However, question Q2 is a different one. What matters 
in Q2 is to discern whether B2* corresponds to the requirement encoded in the definition of  
scientific knowledge in T1. And the answer, in this case, is negative. Aristotle’s references to the 
notion of  scientific knowledge in important passages (e.g., T3-T5) show that the definition of  
scientific knowledge in T1 works with two requirements focused in the notion of  explanation: 
 Cf. Metaphysics VI.2, 1027a19-21. I could have included the passage 1027a19-24 in this paper. However, this will 30
take me too long, for the expression “συμβεβηκός” is being used differently from what is found in T1. I have dealt 
with these issues elsewhere (cf. Angioni 2016, p. 91-100).
 See references on note 21.31
 Furthermore, my interpretation explains Aristotle’s attitude in I.30 in a better way. On the traditional 32
interpretation, the purpose of  I.30 would be exactly to correct B2 in terms of  B2*. However, it would be surprising 
if  Aristotle had made such a correction with no announcement or preparation—and Aristotle was fully aware of  the 
possibility of  having his words wrongly understood, see Incessu Animalium 709b20-23. On my interpretation, Aristotle 
is not changing his mind; he is only warning us that the “necessity” terminology, which has been applied to 
explanatory relations, is now being applied to the premises themselves (as predicative ties).
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Requirement A requires knowing that the cause of  the explanandum X is in fact its cause; 
Requirement B, understood in terms of  B5, requires acknowledging that the fact that this cause is the 
cause of  X cannot be otherwise. Strictly speaking, Aristotle’s efforts in clarifying the conditions on 
which we attain scientific knowledge of  a given explanandum X are efforts to clarify how 
Requirement B must be understood. 
5.a.2) Other passages from the Posterior Analytics: 
I stress that, in two crucial passages from the APo, Aristotle refers to the notion of  scientific 
knowledge without making any allusion to the notion of  necessity as taken by the traditional 
interpretation (i.e., in terms of  B2 or B2*). 
Thus, in APo I.14, we read the following: 
T6: “Among the figures, it is the first that most provides knowledge. For it is 
through the first figure that mathematical sciences (like arithmetic, geometry and optics) 
and all the others conduct the investigation of  the why. The syllogism of  the why runs in 
this figure either in all cases, or for the most part and in most cases. Consequently, it is 
also the first figure that most provides knowledge, given that the most decisive for having 
knowledge is to identify the why” (79a16-24, my translation). 
This passage involves several difficulties.  But only one point concerns me now—a point 33
that applies to other passages too. If  both requirements, Requirement A and Requirement B, are 
equally important in the definition of  scientific knowledge in T1, then we must expect T6 to refer 
to the latter too. If  Requirement B should be understood in terms of  B2 or B2*, Aristotle could 
have said: “the most decisive for having knowledge is, besides identifying the why, knowing that 
the propositions in question are necessarily true (or true for the most part)”. But he did not say 
that. He has highlighted that “the most decisive for having knowledge is to identify the why”.  
One might argue that Aristotle has not retrieved Requirement B in T6 because his subject
—a comparison between the syllogistic figures—does not depend on it. It could be so. But the 
lack of  any reference or allusion to Requirement B in T6 can be explained in a much more 
satisfactory way if  Requirement B is understood in terms of  B5. For, given that B5 requires the 
 For detailed discussion, see Mendell 1998. See also Barnes 1969, p. 144; McKirahan 1992, p. 150.33
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full explanatory appropriateness of  the cause in relation to its pragma, we can say that B5 is giving 
us more specific conditions to cash out Requirement A. The definition of  scientific knowledge in T1 
starts with Requirement A: it requires knowing the cause and the why. But this is not enough, for 
one must capture the cause that is the primary or most appropriate one. In this picture, it is completely 
understandable that Aristotle refers to the notion of  scientific knowledge in the summarized and 
abbreviated way found in T6. My point is that, if  Requirement B is understood in terms of  B5, 
an explicit reference to the specific kind of  cause able to explain its explanandum in the most 
appropriate way can be absent in contexts in which it does not matter—in contexts in which a 
generic description is enough. This is what happens in T6: Aristotle retrieves the notion of  
scientific knowledge by means of  a generic description that is enough for his purposes in the 
context—much in the way we do when we say, e.g., that craft is a capacity, full stop. Besides, other 
passages make explicit reference to the notion of  primary cause, which retrieves Requirement B 
understood in terms of  B5, as I will now explore.   34
In fact, if  Requirement B is understood in terms of  B2 or B2*, it will result in a condition 
completely different from Requirement A, a second condition that is extrinsically added to 
Requirement A. Thus, if  Aristotle’s definition of  scientific knowledge works with two different 
requirements, blended together with no inner connection between them (as suggested in Barnes 
1993, p. 92), the omission of  one of  them turns out to be more difficult to explain. More 
particularly, the lack of  reference to Requirement B2 (or B2*) in passages such as T6 turns out to 
be more difficult to explain—even more difficult if, as Barnes (1993, p. 92) has suggested, 
mathematics were more concerned with necessity than with explanatoriness. 
In APo II.11, we read thus:  
T7: “Given that we think we have scientific knowledge when we know the cause, 
and the causes are four […]; all them are displayed through a middle term” (94a20-24). 
 Moreover, several uses of  “τὸ αἴτιον” and “τὸ διότι” in Aristotle’s works are such that the definite article “τό” plays 34
the role of  pointing out “the cause”, namely, that cause which is the one required for the fully appropriate explanation 
(even with no adjectives attached to the term). In 78b15, “τὸ αἴτιον” is retriving “τὸ πρῶτον αἴτιον” mentioned in 
78b3-4 (cf. Angioni 2018, p. 164). Something similar occurs in Metaphysics VII.17: in 1041b7, we find “τὸ αἴτιον”, 
but in 1041b28 it becomes clear that Aristotle was talking about the αἴτιον πρῶτον. In 194b19-20 (which will be 
discussed below as T11), “the why” is taken as equivalent to “primary cause”. See also 75a35, 93a4, 413a20.
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If  both requirements, Requirement A and Requirement B, are equally important in the 
definition of  scientific knowledge in T1, and if  the Requirement B must be understood in terms 
of  B2 or B2*, then we must expect Aristotle to make an explicit reference to it in T7. Again, the 
lack of  explicit reference to Requirement B is easily explainable if  we take it in terms of  B5. For, 
in this case, Requirement B—far from being a completely different requirement, concurrently 
added to Requirement A—turns out to be a specification that clarifies in a more fine-grained way the 
conditions on which knowledge of  the cause (satisfying Requirement A) delivers scientific 
knowledge.  
I am aware that my argument concerning T7 has a possible weakness, if  taken in isolation. 
One might object—correctly, in a way—that the lack of  explicit reference to Requirement B in 
T7 is easily explainable by the fact that T7 is stricly concerned with specifying the four kinds of  
causes, as a further refinement of  Requirement A. So, the lack of  reference to the Necessity 
Requirement in T7 hardly proves anything about the definition of  scientific knowledge in T1. 
However, the reason for including T7 in my present list is that T7 repeats a pattern found 
in many other passages in which Aristotle makes reference to his definition of  scientific 
knowledge. Thus, T7, isolated in itself, would never be able to give robust evidence for my claim, 
but it has its importance even so, for it is on a piece with other passages outside the APo in which 
Aristotle refers to the notion of  scientific knowledge. With two important exceptions—Metaphysics 
VII.15 and Ethica Nicomachea VI.1-3, the latter of  which will be discussed below—all these 
passages do not have any explicit reference to Requirement B, and most of  them make explicit 
reference to Requirement A. Aristotle’s phrasing in most of  those passages seems to imply that 
having scientific knowledge of  a given explanandum X can be briefly summarised in one single 
characteristic: knowing the cause (or the primary cause) by which X is what it is. I intend to show 
that those passages, far from abandoning Requirement B as found in T1, can be much more 
satisfactorily understood in terms of  B5.   35
A supposedly recalcitrant case, which seems to count in favour of  the traditional 
interpretation, will be discussed later with more detail—Ethica Nicomachea VI.1-3. Before 
examining it,  I offer a survey of  other passages.  
 I still add 71b30-31, as well as this passage from I.24: “if  a demonstration is a syllogism that shows the cause and 35
the why, and if  the universal is more of  a cause (…); therefore, also the universal demonstration is better, for it is, 
most of  all, of  the cause and of  the why” (85b23-27). But my list of  passages is large enough—and I would take me 
too long to argue that the passage from I.24 must be taken serioulsy in many aspects.
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5.b) Beyond the Posterior Analytics: 
5.b.1) No mention of  Requirement B: 
I start with two passages from the Organon. At the beginning of  the Topics, Aristotle clarifies 
what he is calling “demonstration” in this way:   
T8: “A syllogism is a demonstration when it proceeds from true and primary 
[premises], or from [premises] such that the principle for knowing them is attained by 
means of  true and primary [premises]”.  (100a27-29, my translation) 
In order to clarify what he is calling “demonstration”, Aristotle does not resume any of  the 
requirements that define scientific knowledge in T1—neither Requirement A nor Requirement 
B. Given that “demonstration” is several times employed for the kind of  argument that expresses 
scientific knowledge, it would be likely for Aristotle to resume those requirements.  However, the 36
differences between T1 and T8 need not be exaggerated, for they can be well explained from the 
different concerns that predominate in each context. T1 belongs to a treatise devoted to explore 
what scientific knowledge consists in. Accordingly, T1 defines exactly the central notion Aristotle 
will be dealing with along the treatise. In contrast, T8 belongs to a treatise meant to be a kind of  
practical guide for dialectical reasoning. Furthermore, T8 does not define a central notion, but an 
auxiliary notion—a foil which will allow the reader to grasp the central notion in the Topics, i.e., 
the notion of  dialectical argument, with more distinctness. 
One might argue that the notion of  primary premises includes some implicit allusion to the 
requirements that characterise scientific knowledge in the APo. The adjective “primary” (πρῶτον) 
is employed in a more generic way in several passages (cf. 71b21, 76a29), but in 72a5-6 it is 
associated with the notion of  appropriate principles, which, from what has been said in 71b20-32, 
involves the notion of  explanatory appropriateness.  However, this line of  arguments is not 37
promising. For, right in the next passage from the Topics, Aristotle elucidates what he means with 
the conjunction of  the adjectives “true” and “primary”, and what he says is this: “true and 
 The noun “ἀπόδειξις” (as well as the verb “ἀποδείκνυμι”) is used in many ways in Aristotle (cf. Rhetorics 1355a5, 36
1396a33, 1403a15, 1417b21, 23, 1418a5; Poetics, 1450a7; 1450b11; 1456a37). See Barnes 1969, p. 138. But there is 
no doubt that, in T8, “ἀπόδειξις” is used with the force also found in APo I.2. 
 For details, see Angioni 2012a, p. 12-23, 49-51.37
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primary are the items that are trustworthy in virtue of  themselves but not due to something 
else” (100a30-b19). Now, this elucidation is far from being crystal clear, but one thing is certain—
and is enough for my discussion. Aristotle does not associate the term “primary”, in T8, to any 
characteristic that could be linked to the Causal Requirement in T1. Aristotle is employing 
“primary” in an epistemological way: the attitude and cognitive state of  the person developing an 
argument is the rationale for calling a premise “primary” in this way. When Aristotle adds, a little 
further ahead, that “for the demonstrative principles, one need not ask the why” (100b19-20), he 
is not focusing on the explanatory power these principles would have for this or that 
explanandum; he is focusing instead on the fact that they bring by themselves the conviction 
about their truth, without requiring any further justification.  Aristotle has good reasons to 38
employ the terms in this way in the Topics. For his aim is to characterize the kind of  argument 
(namely, dialectical argument) in which the premises taken by the disputants are not taken 
because they seem true to them (even when they are indeed true), but because they are endoxa, 
namely, well accepted or acceptable to some group of  people that turns out to be relevant for the 
dispute.  The most important item, for an argument to be dialectical, is this status of  the 39
premises. Within the limits of  the dialectical dispute, the credentials of  the premises stem from 
their being accepted or acceptable to some groups of  people.  Dialectical arguments are 40
confined within these limits—and this also gives Aristotle good reason to omit any reference to 
Requirement A in T8. (Had Aristotle referred to Requirement A in T8, his definition of  
dialectical argument could have implied, erroneously, that dialectical arguments, in contrast with 
demonstrations, could never engage in discussions about explanations or explanatory opinions.) 
Besides, if  Requirement B in T1 were to be understood in terms of  B2 or B2*, the lack of  
reference to it in T8 would have been more surprising, for B2 or B2* would have given Aristotle 
an excellent foil to elaborate the contrast with dialectical arguments. We could have said then: 
“on the one hand, a syllogism is demonstrative when one knows that its propositions are 
necessarily true, whereas, on the other hand, a syllogism is dialectical when the propositions are 
 I disagree with Barnes 1981, p. 48: “the analysis of  primitiveness at 100b18-21 implies […] explanatoriness […] 38
and appropriateness is said to follow from explanatoriness”. 
 For details about this discussion, see Rapp 2018, p. 113-119; Frede 2012, p. 213-4; Smith 1997, p. xxiii, Mendonça 39
2014, p. 192-194; Mendonça 2015, p. 84-90. For a different view, see Reinhardt 2015.
 And this is why dialectical contenders can embrace (in different moments of  the debate) contrary theses, whereas 40
demonstration can only take what is true, on the basis of  its being true (cf. 72a9-11).
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assumed only because they are well accepted (or acceptable)”.  Now, it is true that Aristotle’s not 41
having adopted this route in T8 does not prove anything about T1. But even so T8 adds some 
weight on my side, taken together with other passages in which Aristotle alludes to his notion of  
scientific knowledge or scientific demonstration.  
Another important passage in the Organon is found in the Sophistical Refutations. 
Demonstrations, taken as expressions of  scientific knowledge, are presented under the description 
of  “didactic arguments”:    42
  
T9: “Didactic arguments are those which deduce from the principles appropriate 
to each lesson, but not from the opinions of  the answerer” (165b1-3, my translation).  43
As in the beginning of  the Topics, it is clear that Aristotle’s concern is to highlight the 
contrast between different kind of  arguments by means of  the epistemic attitudes of  those who 
are employing the arguments. But, differently from the Topics, the reference to appropriate 
principles in T9 connects with the notion of  explanatory appropriateness as characterised in the 
APo (71b23, 72a5-6)—and it is uncontroversially clear that the notion of  explanatory 
appropriateness presupposes Requirement A. In contrast, T9 does not make any allusion to 
Requirement B understood in terms of  B2 (or B2*). Now, if  my interpretation is right, the notion 
of  appropriate principles can be understood as packing together both Requirements, A and B5. 
Besides these passages from the Organon, there are relevant passages from the Physics and 
the Metaphysics in which Aristotle refers to his notion of  scientific knowledge as defined in T1. We 
read the following in the beginning of  the Physics: 
 Intepretations of  dialectic that understand endoxon as “probable” would be even more tempted to take the contrast 41
in modal terms (for criticisms of  these interpretations, see Smith 1997, p. xxiii, Brunschwig 2002, p. 113-114; Barnes 
1980, p. 498-502). Those interpretations would have even more difficulty in explaining the lack of  reference to 
Requirement B in T8.
 Further ahead after T9, Aristotle makes it clear that he is talking about scientific demonstrations: “we have already 42
spoken about demonstrative arguments in the Analytics” (165b8-9). See Barnes 1969, p. 140; Barnes 1981, p. 44; 
Hasper 2013, p. 289-291; Fait 2007, p. 105.
 I disagree with those who take “ἑκάστου μαθήματος” in 165b1 as “of  each discipline”. “Μάθημα” can also be taken 43
as lesson either in the sense of  a particular lesson (in which a bunch of  theorems are conveyed to the learner) or in the 
sense of  a particular theorem that one learner comes to learn. I prefer this last option, which makes 165b1 be 
together with many occurrences of  “ἑκάστου/ ἕκαστον” (71b9, 75b38, 76a4, 27, 184a12, 194b18-19, 983a25, 
996b19) referring to a particular explanandum within a given discipline. 
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T10: “In all disciplines in which there is systematic knowledge of  things with 
principles, causes, or elements, it arises from a grasp of  those: we think we have 
knowledge of  a thing when we have found its primary causes and principles, and followed 
it back to its elements.” (184a10-14,  Charlton’s translation, my italics). 
Aristotle’s terminology in T10 might mislead some readers to wonder about subtleties 
involved in the differences of  the verbs employed, “εἰδέναι”, “ἐπίστασθαι” and “γινώσκειν”. 
However—subtleties à la Prodicus aside—it is clear that Aristotle resumes his notion of  scientific 
knowledge as defined in T1. Several passages employ “εἰδέναι” and “ἐπίστασθαι” as equivalent 
expressions—not only in the APo but in many other treatises.  If  that were not enough, it is 44
Aristotle himself  who highlights the equivalence at the beginning of  the Physics, if—as I take to be 
correct—the “καί” which connects them in T10 must be taken as epexegetic.  
Given this preliminary remark about terminology, note that T10 alludes to the notion of  
scientific knowledge with a clear reference to Requirement A, but no reference to Requirement 
B. Having scientific knowledge of  a given thing consists in acknowledging its (primary) causes and 
principles, but there is no allusion to the requirement of  knowing that the propositions in 
question are necessarily true. One might object that the lack of  any reference to Requirement B 
(taken in terms of  B2) is more than natural, for the Physics (and natural science in general) deals 
with entities subject to change, so that the propositions about those entities are true only for the 
most part, but not necessarily. Now, this objection has many weaknesses, but I want to 
concentrate on one of  them.  As we know, the domain of  entities subject to change embraces 45
almost all domains in which Aristotle has developed his scientific enterprises. Given that, why 
should we insist in (and start with) an interpretation of  T1 that delivers a definition of  scientific 
 For details about this issue, see Bronstein 2016, p. 18-21; Burnyeat 2011, p. 20-24. See Barnes 2014, p. 91 44
(although he takes T1 differently): “Among the different Greek verbs there are indeed differences of  nuance or colour 
and differences in idiom so that in a given context one of  the verbs may be more appropriate than the others. But 
there are no semantic differences, no differences in sense”.
 For instance: it is precipitate to assume that all scientific propositions in the Physics are destined to be true only for the 45
most part. Actually, this is false. Physics contains several propositions that Aristotle surely takes as necessarily true, as the 
propositions involving the chain of  change leading to the Primary Mover (Book VIII), the consolidated definitions of  
infinite, time, place etc., as well as the thesis that any change requires an underlying subject. It is important to avoid 
conflation between the Physics and the treatises on natural sciences. But even the latter involve propositions that are 
necessarily true—at least several definitions are necessarily true. I do not see any evidence to deny that, for Aristotle, 
the proposition that (e.g.) sheep are blooded animals is necessarily true.
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knowledge that turns out to be inadequate and incompatible with almost all scientific enterprises 
developed by Aristotle?  
At this juncture, traditional interpretation has its usual stock of  tales: Aristotle has changed 
his mind; the “Posterior Analytics formalism” has revealed incompatible with the more flexible 
notion of  scientific knowledge stemming from Aristotle’s empirical explorations, and so on.  46
However, there is no textual (or psychographed) evidence for this presumed change of  mind. And 
the presumed incompatibility between the notion of  scientific knowledge found in the APo and 
the scientific practices found in the biological treatises—an old clichê, very popular in past 
decades—is only a result of  the inability to understand Aristotle’s several discussions in their due 
contexts.  The definition of  scientific knowledge in T1 works basically with the same 47
characteristics found in T10. There is no explicit reference to Requirement B in T10. However, 
this lack of  reference is not problematic, if  Requirement B is understood in terms of  B5. For, in 
this case, B5 consists in a more fine-grained specification of  Requirement A, instead of  being a 
completely different, additional requirement, about the necessary truth of  the propositions 
involved in scientific knowledge. Thus, having scientific knowledge of  X requires knowing what is 
the cause of  X, and—to make the point clearer—requires knowing that this cause is really the 
cause of  X, namely, this cause could never be a different one, for no other cause would explain X 
in the most appropriate way. On this perspective, it is clear how the definition of  scientific 
knowledge in T1 was meant to work: Requirement A is, in some way, the main requirement, the 
one that can be employed as a heading, able to do the job in several contexts in which details are 
not needed and a generic characterisation is enough. Requirement B, far from adding a 
completely different condition, only specifies what kind of  cause is required for having scientific 
knowledge.  
Furthermore, it is important to note that T10 does not speak of  causes in a generic way, but 
makes explicit reference to primary causes and primary principles. The term “primary” (“πρῶτον”) 
is used in several ways (cf. 71b21, 26; 72a28, b5, 73b40, 74a11-13, 74b25, 75a36, 76a29, 76a32, 
76b14), and I have already remarked that, in T8, it has an epistemological connotation that has 
nothing to do with the notion of  explanatory appropriateness. However, in several contexts—
 The style is found in LeBlond 1939. But see also Barnes 1993, p. 92.46
 Lennox 2001 is monumental against the alleged incompatibility. See also Angioni 2009c, p. 65.47
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some of  which will be examined below—the term “primary” is used exactly to mark the notion 
of  explanatory appropriateness (cf. 72a4-6) . Furthermore, applied to “cause” (cf. 78a25-6, b4) or 
“middle term” (cf. 99a25) or even with no noun attached to it (cf. 72a31, 74b25), “primary” picks 
up exactly the explanatory factor that delivers the most appropriate explanation. This being so, 
we can say that the explicit reference to primary causes and primary principles, in T10, retrieves 
precisely the Requirement B understood in terms of  B5.   48 49
Further ahead in the Physics, we read thus: 
T11: “we think we have knowledge of  a thing only when we grasp ‘the why’ [τὸ 
διὰ τί] about it, and that is to grasp the primary cause” (194b18-20, Charlton’s translation 
modified, my italics). 
Aristotle refers only to Requirement A, but not to Requirement B. Again, my argument 
could be objected with the same reasoning applicable to T7. Both in Physics II.3 and in APo II.11, 
Aristotle is basically concerned with his theory of  the Four Causes, so that it is natural for him to 
refer to the notion of  scientific knowledge only through Requirement A, omitting Requirement 
B.  But, in this case, this objection raises a discomfort. It is true that Aristotle’s predominant 50
concern with his theory of  the Four Causes might explain the lack of  any reference to 
Requirement B understood in terms of  B2 (or B2*). However, the remark that modern editors 
put into parenthesis—“and this [sc. grasping the why of  each thing] is to grasp the primary 
cause” (194b19-20)—is not well fitted into the objection’s story. The adjective “primary” attached 
to “cause” is commonly used by Aristotle to indicate precisely that cause which, among others, is 
the most important and the most appropriate for the scientific explanation of  a given 
explanandum.  On my interpretation, Aristotle is perfectly justified in emphasising the notion of  51
primary cause in his reminder that retrieves the notion of  scientific knowledge as defined in T1. 
 Pace Pellegrin 2002, p. 70, n1, and several others who follow the ancient commentators, as Ross 1936, p. 457. 48
 I suggest that something similar can be associated with the expression “up to the elements” at the end of  T10, 49
which can be taken as a way of  stressing that the primary causes consist in the essential elements on which something 
depends to be what it is. Besides, in 84b22, Aristotle states that the elements of  demonstrations are indemonstrable 
premises (on this, see Crager 2015, p. 52, 92, and a different opinion in Malink 2017, p. 173-186).
 There are differences between Physics II.3 and APo II.11 concerning the theory of  the Four Causes, but they are 50
irrelevant for my purposes here. 
 See Angioni 2018, p. 164. Cf. note 28. About T11, it is noteworthy that Ross 1936, p. 512, takes the adjective 51
“primary” with the force of  “proximate”, although he has a different opinion about T10.
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For Requirement B, understood in terms of  B5, specifies with more exactness that the cause 
required for scientific knowledge of  each thing is precisely that cause which cannot be a different 
one—the cause fully appropriate to explain the explanandum in question or, in the terminology 
with which T11 refers to Requirement B, the primary cause. 
Similar to T11 is the passage from the beginning of  the Metaphysics which precedes the 
critical evaluation Aristotle is going to give of  his predecessors about the first principles and the 
highest causes. This is what we read: 
T12: “Given that it is clear that we must come to know the causes that 
hold as principles (for we state that we know each thing precisely when we think 
we have spotted its primary cause)” (983a24-26, my translation, my italics). 
Aristotle’s reference to his notion of  scientific knowledge in T12—as well as in T11—gives 
central weight to the notion of  primary cause. Now, one might raise the following objection: there 
is no trace of  the notion of  primary cause in the official definition of  scientific knowledge in T1; 
in contrast, T12 does not make any reference to the Necessity Requirement (i.e., Requirement B 
understood in terms of  B2); therefore, T12 must be referring to another conception of  scientific 
knowledge, different from the one found in the APo (perhaps developed in a lost treatise etc.).  52
But we should refrain from speculations with no exegetical evidence, especially when a better 
interpretation is perfectly defensible on the basis of  the available evidence. As I said about T10 
and T11, Aristotle’s emphasis on the notion of  primary cause in his reference to the notion of  
scientific knowledge (as defined in T1) is perfectly justified. For Requirement B, understood in 
terms of  B5, only specifies with more exactness what cause is required for having scientific 
knowledge of  each thing. Requirement A only states the condition of  knowing that the cause of  
the explanandum in question is indeed its cause. Requirement B specifies (with more exactness) 
that scientific knowledge requires that cause which cannot be a different one in relation to the 
explanandum at stake—and, as Aristotle will cash out in the ensuing discussions in the APo, this 
cause is the cause fully appropriate to explain that explanandum or, in other terms, the primary 
cause. Thus, the progression from Requirement A to Requirement B5, as elements in the 
definiens stated in T1, is analogous to a progression in which we attempted to characterize 
 This style of  argument is found in LeBlond 1939. I should emphasise that “primary cause” here has the same force 52
as I attributed to it in T11 (pace Ross 1924, p. 126). See notes 34 and 50.
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human beings by saying this: “a human being is an animal having feet; more precisely, a biped 
one”. As we know, the information that human beings are animals that have feet is contained in 
the information that human beings are biped animals (cf. Metaphysics 1038a22-23). The 
progression from Requirement A to Requirement B5 is a step from a generic heading (“we need 
to know the cause”) to a specification that takes the generic heading on its most essential point 
(“we need to know, more precisely, that the explanatory connection between that cause and its 
explanandum cannot be otherwise”). Therefore, employing the notion of  primary cause to remind 
the reader about the definition of  scientific knowledge has the same basic effect as employing 
Requirement B understood in terms of  B5. Moreover—as I will explore below—if  Requirement 
A is in a way contained in Requirement B5 (as having feet is contained in biped), it does not need to 
be explicitly mentioned, as this explains why sometimes Aristotle relies only on Requirement B5 
to present his notion of  scientific knowledge.  
Another passage from the Metaphysics is the following: 
T13: “in other cases also (even in those of  which there is demonstration) we think 
we know each thing when we know what it is, e.g. what squaring is, viz. that it is the 
finding of  a mean; and similarly in all other cases.” (996b18-22, my translation) 
This passage should be taken with caution, for several reasons. First, we need caution 
because the passage is found in Book III of  the Metaphysics, in a context in which Aristotle is 
developing aporiai concerning the nature and proper task of  wisdom taken as the knowledge of  
the first principles and the highest causes. The development of  aporiai in Metaphysics III sometimes 
counts with premises that do not correspond to any thesis embraced by Aristotle himself. 
Sometimes the premises are theses genuinely accepted by Aristotle, but many times they are only 
the premises needed for the formulation of  the dilemma, giving support and some credibility to 
one of  the sides of  the difficulty. It would take me too long do discuss which is exactly the 
situation in T13. Secondly, the example involved in the passage seems to be the geometrical 
problem of  squaring a figure (a circle?)—finding a proof  that there is a square the area of  which 
corresponds to the area of  a given figure (circle?)—, which is too complex to be satisfactorily 
discussed within the limits of  this paper.  Thirdly, T13 suggests that Aristotle has in mind a 53
 For the squaring of  a circle, see Mueller 1982, p. 164; Dorion 1995, p. 288; Fait 2007, p. 155; Hasper 2013, p. 53
314-320. I have dealt with the issue in Angioni 2012b, p. 208-211; Angioni 2016, p. 100.
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model of  demonstration in which the most relevant explanatory role is played by the essence of  
the attribute to be explained, such that knowing why X obtains (X being an attribute) turns out to 
be equivalent to knowing what X is.  But, again, the discussion of  this point would imply a series 54
of  other exegetical issues that would not fit here.  
These three reasons ask for caution in the interpretation of  T13. Even so, I submit that the 
fundamental premise involved in this passage does correspond, in fact, to a thesis accepted by 
Aristotle. At a first glance, the thesis does not seem to have any similarity with Requirements A 
and B found in the definition of  scientific knowledge at T1. However, in Book II of  the APo, 
Aristotle explicitly argues for the thesis that “the what-it-is is the same as the why-it-is” (90a14-15) 
and, further ahead, that “knowing what-it-is is the same as knowing the cause of  being 
something” (93a4).  Aristotle proposes an equivalence between knowing the cause why a given 55
subject is of  such and such a quality (i.e., has this or that attribute) and knowing what something 
is (i.e., what the attribute is). This equivalence consists exactly in the core of  the model of  
demonstration in which the most relevant explanatory role is played by the essence of  the 
attribute to be explained.  And it is this equivalence that allows us to connect T13 to Aristotle’s 56
definition of  scientific knowledge in T1. According to T13, having scientific knowledge about the 
squaring [e.g., of  a circle] consists in knowing what that squaring exactly is. Now—if  we follow 
the model presented in the Book II of  the APo (especially in 90a14-15 and 93a4)—knowing what 
exactly the squaring of  the circle is amounts to knowing what is the cause the makes the area of  
given circle correspond to the area of  a square. This equivalence between knowing the cause and 
knowing the what-it-is makes it clear that T13 is also relying on the definition of  scientific 
knowledge in T1. Thus, Requirement A requires knowing the cause by which the circle is 
squared; Requirement B (understood in terms of  B5) requires a further specification, namely, that 
the cause at stake must be exactly that one which cannot be otherwise, namely, the cause that 
 To use the terminology found in Bronstein 2016, p. 48-50, it is the “Model 2” of  scientific explanation (or, for 54
Ferejohn 2013, p. 153, the “causal model” of  demonstration). For discussion, see Angioni 2014a, p. 103-9; Zuppolini 
2018b, p. 231-2. 
 In 93a4, I prefer the reading “αἴτιον τοῦ τί ἐστι” (Bekker), instead of  “αἴτιον τοῦ εἰ ἐστι” (Ross). In the expression 55
at stake, “τί εστι” is not the typical question for the essence, given that the “τι” is not interrogative and actually refers 
to some non-essential attribute, as occurs in 90a3-4.
 For discussion, see Charles 2000, p. 198-213; Goldin 1996, p. 108-134; Bronstein 2016, p. 48-50; Angioni 2014b, 56
p. 103-107; Zuppolini 2016, p. 202-203; Zuppolini 2017, p. 47-60; Zuppolini 2018b, p. 231-2, 243-245; Almeida 
2017; Ferejohn 2013, p. 134-147.
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furnishes the fully appropriate explanation of  the squaring by stating what that squaring is and 
thereby grasping its essence.  57
There is also a passage from Book VI of  the Metaphysics, which is very informative: 
T14: “in general every science which is ratiocinative or at all involves reasoning 
deals with causes and principles, either more exact or more simplistic; but all these 
sciences mark off  some particular being—some genus, and inquire into this, but not into 
being simpliciter nor qua being, nor do they offer any explanation of  the what-it-is; but 
starting from the what-it-is—some making it plain to the senses, others assuming it as a 
hypothesis—they thus demonstrate, either more necessarily or more flexibly, what is 
attributed per se to the genus with which they deal.” (1025b5-13, my translation, modified 
from Ross’).  
This passage is also full of  exegetical issues that cannot be discussed in detail in this paper. I 
will select some points that are important for my present purposes. First of  all, Aristotle refers to 
Requirement A, but does not seem to refer to Requirement B. Now, one might argue that the 
word “ἐπιστήμη” in 1025b6 does not refer to the notion of  scientific knowledge, but is used with 
a broader scope. Indeed, it can be argued that the same word seems to be implied in 1025b21, as 
that to which the adjectives “πρακτική” (“devoted to action”) and  “ποιητική” (“productive” ou 
“devoted to craft production”) are attached, so that the overall context of  T14 must be taken as 
talking about three kinds of  knowledge (theoretical, practical and productive) instead of  three kinds 
of  sciences in the strict sense of  scientific knowledge. A similar terminological behaviour seems to 
be found again in 1026a22. On this picture, one might argue that the lack of  reference to 
Requirement B is fully justified by the fact that “ἐπιστήμη” is being used in a more flexible way. 
For the Necessity Requirement, understood in terms of  B2, does not seem to apply to practical 
knowledge, nor to the knowledge encoded in technical skills. 
It would take me too far to discuss these issues in detail.  It is enough for my purposes to 58
remark a few points. First, Aristotle’s language in T14 mostly corresponds to the jargon employed 
in the APo—demonstrating the per se attributes (75a29-31, b1-2; 76b11-13) of  a given genus 
 I will not discuss the Model 2 of  scientific explanation (or demonstration). For discussion, see Zuppolini 2017, p. 57
181. To be honest, I believe that Model 2 is strictly speaking the only model, found even in Book I of  the APo (see 
Angioni 2014a, p. 103-107, Angioni 2016, p. 150-152).
 For detailed discussion of  the epistemic status of  practical philosophy in Aristotle, see Karbowski 2019 and Henry 58
2015; for detailed discussion of  the epistemic status of  craft knowledge, see Aimar & Pavese (manuscript).
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(74b25, 75a42, 76b12-13), positing hypotheses (72a20-24, 76b23-34) etc. The terminological 
similarity is not superficial. Aristotle seems to be really referring to his notion of  demonstrative 
knowledge, which grasps the causes explaining why, within a determinate domain, a given subject 
has the attributes that pertain to it in itself. It is not persuasive to claim that T14 is not making 
reference to the notion of  scientific knowledge as defined in T1 and as developed in the APo as a 
whole. After all, Aristotle starts T14 with a clear reference to Requirement A.  
Furthermore, we should ask why Requirement B was not explicitly referred to in T14. A 
reference to Requirement B understood in terms of  B2 would suit the passage very well, given 
that the ultimate aim of  the whole chapter consists in presenting the science of  being qua being 
as first philosophy, which deals with eternal beings (cf. 1026a10ff.). Indeed, the science of  being 
qua being deals with objects that are stricly necessary and, thereby, involves propositions that are 
necessarily true (instead of  being true only for the most part)—either if  the object of  that science 
is taken as the first mover (cf. 1026a17) or if  its object is taken as being qua being in general (cf. 
1026a31-32), which has (e.g.) the characteristic of  being convertible with one (cf. 1003b22-25) 
and the property of  not being subject to contradiction (cf. 1005a19ff.). On this picture, 
Requirement B would give Aristotle an extraordinary source from which to characterise the 
science of  being qua being in a very informative way. 
One might argue that the reference to Requirement B2 is found at the end of  the passage, 
encoded in the expression “[they demonstrate] either more necessarily or more flexibly”. 
However, this very expression—contrary to the expectations raised by a superficial reading—
results in evidence against the traditional interpretation. The adjective “ἀναγκαιότερον”, in 
comparative form, refers to something that is more necessary (in some sense of  the expression), 
presumably in contrast with something that, being more flexible or resilient, is less necessary. 
However, the comparative form of  the adjective does not make any sense if  applied to the notion 
of  necessity as understood in B2. I will dwell on this point for the next paragraphs.  
Comparative forms are employed in (at least) two cases, each of  which relies on a specific 
presupposition. The first cases relies on the presupposition that the attribute being compared in 
different subjects is really liable to variation in degree in a proper (non-metaphorical) way—as, 
for instance, in the case in which we say that “this plate is hotter than this cup”. The second case, 
however, presupposes an attribute which, strictly speaking, does not admit variation in degrees, 
but works as a standard, in comparison to which the comparative forms of  the adjective are 
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applied to things which, strictly speaking, do not have the attribute in question, but have 
something that tends to it and can be evaluated in how much it approaches the standard. This is 
the case in which one might say, for instance, that “parrots are more talkative than cats”, or that 
“bees are more divine than gnats”. In this case, there is some connected homonymy between the 
standard and the things to which the comparative forms are applied.  59
First of  all, it is crystal clear that the first case does not apply to the necessity of  a 
predicative tie. For the necessity in a necessarily true predication is not such that would admit a 
variation in degree. It does not make sense to say that the proposition “2 + 2 = 4” is more necessary 
than the proposition “3 + 3 = 6”, as well as it does not make sense to say that “humans are 
animals” is more necessary than “horses are animals”. Besides—as I will explore below—the 
same is true for two other kinds of  necessity, namely, the logical necessity by which conclusions 
follow from premises in deductions, and the explanatory necessity that, on my proposal, is the 
target in T1. Scientific knowledge requires that cause which is the necessary one for the most 
appropriate explanation, and there will be only one such cause for each explanandum. Thus, all 
three usages of  “necessity” are on the same boat: the necessity of  predicative ties, the necessity of  
logical consequence, and the necessity of  the explanatory connections presented in a scientific 
demonstration. Therefore, we are left with the second case, in which the application of  
comparative forms is somehow metaphorical—it relies on the assumption that a given domain of  
items, even without having the attribute in question (strictly speaking), involves something similar 
to that attribute, so that the items in the domain can be mutually compared by taking that 
attribute as a standard. 
In this perspective, one might insist that Aristotle’s use of  comparative forms, in T14, rests 
on a loose metaphor involving the necessity of  predicative ties, as if  he meant something like this: 
“they demonstrate either necessary propositions, which are true necessarily [= ‘the more necessary’], 
or propositions that are true for the most part [= ‘the more flexible and, thereby, less necessary’]”—
and this would count in favour of  option B2* for Requirement B. However, there is a strong 
reason against taking those comparative expressions as evidence in favour of  B2 or B2*. The 
comparative “ἀναγκαιότερον” has an adverbial force and modifies the verb “ἀποδεικνύουσιν”, 
 Thus, strictly speaking, neither parrots nor cats really talk, if  talking is stricly understood as employing articulate 59
language to convey thoughts (or something like that). However, parrots do something similar to talking, so that they can be 
taken as more talkative than other animals etc.
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“demonstrate” . Thus, what Aristotle is saying in T14 is not that what is being demonstrated (e.g., the 60
content encoded in the conclusion) admits variation in the degree of  necessity. He is saying, 
instead, that the way in which the demonstration is produced admits variation in degree. 
In this case, it is impossible to refer the comparative adverb to the strictly logical operation 
made by the demonstration, for, in any demonstration, the logical passage from the premises to the 
conclusion is a entailment relation that does not admit variation of  degree. The conclusion 
necessarily follows from the premises in any valid argument and, a fortiori, in any sound deduction, 
and this relation of  logical consequence does not admit variation of  degree.  Since every 61
demonstration is a sound deduction (even in the biological disciplines that deal with what is true 
only for the most part), the comparative “ἀναγκαιότερον” in 1025b13 cannot be referring to a 
supposed variation in degree of  the logical entailment of  demonstrative conclusions.  For there 62
is no such variation. 
However, if  Requirement B is understood in terms of  B5, the comparative 
“ἀναγκαιότερον” in 1025b13 becomes perfectly intelligible. The explanatory relevance of  a cause 
or explanatory factor is liable to be evaluated in degrees. Variation in degree (even if  not precisely 
measured as in quantities) can be applied to the explanatory success of  an explanation, but 
cannot be applied either to the deductive success of  a demonstration or to the necessary truth of  
predications. If  we have two sound deductions, there is no sense in comparing them as to the 
degree of  being successful in entailing their conclusions, in other words, there is no sense in 
asking which of  those conclusions follows more necessarily from its premises. Similarly, if  we have 
two apodeictic sound deductions (in the sense in which “apodeictic” is employed in modal 
syllogistics), there is no sense in comparing them as to the (supposed) degree of  necessity that 
 Cf. similar expression, with adverbial force, in Rhetoric II.6, 1396a33-b1.60
 This also shows that option B3 cannot be correct as an answer to question Q2.61
 Perhaps one might think that Aristotle does not take demonstrations in the domain of  biology (in which 62
predications are true only for the most part) as valid inferences, and one might insist that this is what he had in mind 
with “ἀναγκαιότερον etc.” in 1025b13: there is some sort of variation in degree in the logical passage from premises to 
conclusions. First of  all, if  demonstrations with for the most part propositions were not valid, there will be no sense in 
using the comparative forms to compare them with valid deductions: we would be back to the first case of  using 
comparative forms. Secondly, Aristotle’s discussion in APo I.30 seems to assume that (e.g.) “every sheep has, for the most 
part, four legs” is, indeed, a logical consequence of  the premises “every quadruped has, for the most part, four legs” 
and “every sheep is a quadruped”. I will not disentangle the details here. For discussion, see Barnes 1982; Aimar & 
Pavese (forth.).
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would apply to their respective conclusions, in other words, there is no sense in asking which of  
these predications is more necessary than the other. 
In contrast, if  we have two sound deductions attempting to explain the same explanandum, 
it makes sense to compare their explanatory success, or, in other words, to ask which pair of  
premises explains the explanandum with more success. Even when we do not target the same 
explanandum, or do not presuppose the same domain, it makes sense to compare the 
explanatory success of  different explanatory attempts, for it makes sense to ask which of  them 
explains its respective explanandum with more appropriateness. That comparisons of  this kind 
are at stake is suggested by Aristotle’s terminology in the beginning of  T14, for he speaks of  
causes or principles that are “either more exact or more simplistic (or oversimplifying)” (ἢ 
ἀκριβεστέρας ἢ ἁπλουστέρας, 1025b7).  Thus, the explanatory success of  demonstrations is 63
liable to variation within a proper range. Demonstrations in general (i.e., demonstrative attempts) 
can capture either the more exact causes, or causes more generic, or even coarse causes. And this 
idea seems to be in harmony with the employment of  “ἐπιστήμη” in a broader way in the 
context of  T14. For practical knowledge as well as productive knowledge are by definition 
involved in explaining their objects, as much as possible, even if  they are not on the same level as 
the most successful theoretical sciences.  
Against this solution, one might still object the following. Even if  the explanatory relevance 
of  causes be liable to an evaluation in degrees, the definition of  scientific knowledge in T1, in 
terms of  B5, requires that the cause captured in a demonstration be the most relevant of  all, 
namely, that cause which, being fully appropriate to its explanandum, cannot be otherwise. In 
other words: the possibility of  evaluating the explanatory success of  causes by degrees does not 
imply that the cause to be captured in a scientific demonstration be liable to such a scale. The 
objection has a correct element: the cause to be grasped in a scientific demonstration must be the 
necessary one for the most appropriate explanation, period. However, my solution does not depend 
on implying that an evaluation by degrees would apply to the cause that must be the necessary 
 It is common to find Aristotle using the adverb “simply” (ἁπλῶς) or cognate expressions to identify a flaw or 63
failure. In Sophistical Refutations 176a39, “ἁπλῶς” is used in opposition to “διαιρούμενον”: if  the subject being 
discussed is complex and requires distinctions, it is wrong to talk in a simple way (if  you do that, you are oversimplifying 
a complex subject). Cf. Generation of  Animals 756b17; Metaphysics 987a21; Ethica Nicomachea 1104b25 (to refer to a 
oversimplifier rival theory), 1137b22 (to refer to the failure of  the legislator in grasping details). Thus, 
“ἁπλουστέρας” in 1025b7—which is clearly in opposition to “more exact” or “more accurate”—, can be properly 
translated as “simplistic” or “oversimplifying”.
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one. When Aristotle applies the comparative “more necessarily” to demonstrations in T14, he 
does not abandon the idea that the cause to be captured in a scientific demonstration is not liable 
to degrees in its explanatory appropriateness: it must be the necessary one, period. But this does not 
prevent Aristotle from applying comparatives forms according to the second case discussed 
above. Thus, he applies the comparatives “more necessarily” and “more flexibly” to attempted 
demonstrations which, without bringing the necessary causes, period, are such that have their 
explanatory success evaluated in degrees—for, even without bringing the necessary causes, they 
involve the same kind of  activity (namely, explaining) that aims at the standard and, therefore, 
can be evaluated according to the degree in which they approach the standard. 
Furthermore, I stress that Aristotle’s definition of  scientific knowledge in T1 is normative, 
but not descriptive: Aristotle means that, ultimately and by the highest standard, only counts as 
scientific knowledge the demonstration that encapsulates the cause which is the necessary one for the 
most appropriate explanation. But Aristotle is aware that this norm is far from being satisfied in 
every attempt. Passages such as T5 show that Aristotle was perfectly aware of  the difficulty in 
finding, and ascertaining, the exact cause that delivers the most appropriate explanation for each 
explanandum. While the standard is not yet fulfilled, he can surely describe scientific disciplines 
in the actual world as presenting demonstrations (i.e., demonstrative attempts) in which the 
explanandum in question is explained “either more necessarily or more flexibly”.  And such a 64
description is even more suited to the context of  T14, which covers practical and productive 
disciplines, besides the theoretical ones.  
5.b.2) Supposed evidence in favour of  the traditional interpretation (Ethica 
Nicomachea VI):  
Some passages are usually appealed to as evidence in favour of  the traditional 
interpretation of  the definition of  scientific knowledge in T1: Metaphysics VII.15, 
1039b27-1040a5; Ethica Nicomachea VI.1, 1139a6-14, VI.3, 1139b18-35. As I said, I will not 
discuss the Metaphysics passage. I will concentrate my discussion on the Nicomachean Ethics passages. 
In the probably most famous of  them, we read thus: 
 On Aristotle’s attitude about the possibility of  progress in scientific disciplines, see De Caelo 287b28-288a2 (cf. 64
Metafísica 993b11-19) and my discussion in Angioni 2010.
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T15: “What scientific knowledge [episteme] is will be clear from the following—if  
we need to put exact specifications and do not be carried away by similarities. We all 
think that that of  which we have scientific knowledge cannot be otherwise. In contrast, it 
escapes our notice whether the things which can be otherwise hold or not, when we are 
not considering them. Therefore, the object of  scientific knowledge is from necessity and, 
therefore, is eternal, for all things that are simpliciter from necessity are eternal, and 
eternal things are not liable to generation and corruption” (1139b18-24, my 
translation).  65
The belief  that T15 is strong evidence for taking Requirement B in terms of  B2 (or, still, 
B1) is precipitate.  The precipitation seems to be favoured by the expressions we normally use in 66
English (or another modern language), such as “object of  scientific knowledge”. In Greek, we 
have the verbal adjective “ἐπιστητόν”, which is very flexible and vague by itself, as well as the 
equivalent expression Aristotle has employed before, “that of  which we have scientific 
knowledge” (ὃ ἐπιστάμεθα). This is the crucial question we should ask: after all, what is, exactly, 
the item of  which we have scientific knowledge? For instance, when we acquire scientific 
knowledge about the lunar eclipse’s obtaining due to the interposition of  the Earth, what is it, 
exactly, that we know scientifically?  
Three answers are perfectly acceptable at large, and none of  them by itself  exclude the 
others. First, when we get scientific knowledge about the lunar eclipse’s holding due to the 
interposition of  the Earth, we can say that what we know scientifically (or that of  which we have 
scientific knowledge) is the lunar eclipse, i.e., a state of  affairs with propositional structure. 
Secondly, according to a different way of  using the same expressions (“that of  which we have 
scientific knowledge” [ὃ ἐπιστάμεθα], “the object of  scientific knowledge” [ἐπιστητόν]), we can 
say that the object of  our scientific knowledge is the Moon. Thirdly, according to another use of  
the same expressions, we can say that the object of  our scientific knowledge is nothing else except 
the explanatory connection between the privation of  light in the Moon (which we use to call “lunar 
eclipse”) and the interposition of  the Earth.  
 This translation is adapted from Angioni 2011b.65
 But this is a common belief. See Barnes 2014, p. 93; Broadie & Rowe 2002, p. 365; Porchat 2001, p. 272-3. 66
Scholars focused on the exegesis of  the ethical treatises do not descry the possibility of  a different, more fine-grained 
interpretation of  Requirement B—even when they try to bridge the gap between ethics and science, as Henry 2015, 
p. 179, n18. For discussion of  the gap, see Karbowski 2019, p. 64.
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Each of  the three answers can be adequate in a given context, and each of  them responds 
to different aspects in which we can consider our knowledge. The first answer seems satisfactory 
in contexts in which we are concerned with certifying and justifying our cognitive states, or 
contexts in which we are focused on the propositional content of  our knowledge as something 
different from mere acquaintance with singular objects. After establishing the appropriate cause 
of  the lunar eclipse, we can say that we know, for sure, that the lunar eclipse is the case: for we 
have a justification that certifies us about the fact. On its turn, the second answer can be taken as 
satisfactory in contexts where the central concern is to map the subject-matters into their proper 
disciplines. Thus, saying (or highlighting) that we have scientific knowledge about the Moon is 
important if  we wish to stress that that piece of  knowledge belongs to the domain of  astronomy 
but not to any other domain (we know something about the Moon, not about abstract objects), or if  
we wish to stress that, within the domain of  astronomy, we are targeting the Moon, not any other 
celestial body. Finally, the third answer seems to be adequate in contexts in which the central 
concern is the appropriate explanation of  a given explanandum. In this case, what we know is, 
exactly, the explanatory relation—we know that the appropriate cause of  the lunar eclipse is the 
interposition of  the Earth (following the pattern “we know that this is the cause of  that”, found in 
71b10-12) or, in other words, we know that it is because the Earth is placed between the Sun and 
the Moon that the Moon undergoes the specific kind of  privation of  light that we identify as an 
eclipse (following the pattern “we know that it is because of  this cause that the predicative tie in the 
explanandum obtains”). 
 None of  the three options by itself  exclude the others as an acceptable way of  describing 
the object of  our knowledge. The preference for one option over the others can only be 
determined by contextual factors in each context in which the expression “object of  scientific 
knowledge” or similar ones are employed. I will argue that the correct option for T15 is the third, 
but, before that, is it important to emphasise that there is more than one option to understand the 
thesis that the object of  scientific knowledge is necessary. The traditional interpretation is not the 
only option—and is far from stemming crystal clear from the text.  67
 The same treatment holds for other relevant occurrences of  “ἐπιστητόν” (as in 73a22, 88b30, 982b31-b2, 996b13) 67
or similar expressions (as in 71b15, 74b6). About “ἐπιστητόν” in APo I.33, see Angioni 2013a, p. 257-262, 266; 
Angioni 2019, p. 173-5, 191-5.
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One might object that Aristotle’s choice of  the adjective “eternal” favours the traditional 
interpretation, for the adjective can only be applied, strictly speaking, to objects and (perhaps) to 
basic truths expressed in predications, but not to explanations, i.e., to explanatory relations 
between an explanandum and its explanans. But this objection is fragile. Aristotle’s policies in 
employing expressions might sound strange to us. Some adjectives that might seem only 
appropriate to objects are equally applied to propositions by Aristotle—as the objection itself  
acknowledges. Now, once the border between objects and propositions is crossed, we should not 
be any more surprised by Aristotle’s applying “eternal” (and similar expressions) to explanatory 
relations (or to the complex propositions that encode those relations).  
Thus, in 75b22 (at least with some codices), the adjective “eternal” (ἀΐδιον) is applied to 
“conclusion” (συμπέρασμα).  In Metaphysics 1025a34 (cf. Generation of  Animals 742b28), “ἀΐδιον” is 68
applied to the relation between per se attributes and their proper subjects—and I stress that those 
relations are, exactly, taken as explananda in most demonstrations. Futhermore, in  75b27, the 
adjective “corruptible” (φθαρτή) is applied to “proposition” or “premise” (πρότασις), and it is not 
seldom that Aristotle refers to a necessarily true proposition with the adjective “ἀκίνητον”, which 
means “not liable to change” (cf. 1052a4-7; 1222b23). Within a picture like this, there is no 
surprise in the employment of  “eternal” to characterise the relation between an explanans and its 
explanandum—and this employment does not depend on the modal status of  the basic 
predications involved in the explanation. Strictly speaking, the adverb “always” (ἀεί) in 75b34 is 
directly applied to demonstrations in such a way that suggests that, although particular lunar 
eclipses are phenomena occurring only many times, the causal-explanatory relation underlying 
them is eternal—for it holds always.  As we know, it is not always that a sheep is born with four 69
legs. Nonetheless, this does not prevent the explanatory connection between having four legs (for the 
most part) and being a blooded animal of  such and such a kind from being eternal or necessary. 
Furthermore, Aristotle applies the adjective “eternal” to causes in Metaphysics 1026a17. At first, he 
seems to be talking about the First Mover—an “object”, at least as this expression is employed as 
opposed to propositions. But, as Aristotle applies the same adjective in general to all causes 
 See Angioni 2009a, p. 85-86, for discussion of  other reading found in the codices.68
 See Angioni 2009a, p. 75-82.69
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involved in the context, he seems to have in mind the causes or explanatory connections studied 
in mathematics and natural sciences too.  70
There are many other issues about T15, but the passage that immediately follows it is even 
more important for my purposes. This is what we read: 
T16: “Furthermore, it is agreed that every scientific knowledge is teachable, and 
that the object of  scientific knowledge is learnable. As we said in the Analytics, every 
learning proceeds from items previously known, sometimes by induction, sometimes on 
the basis of  syllogism. Now, induction too is a principle for universals, whereas syllogisms 
proceeds from universals. Therefore, there are principles, from which the syllogism 
proceeds, of  which there is no syllogism. Therefore, there is induction for them. Thus, 
scientific knowledge is a an aptness to demonstrate, and all the things we have 
additionally stated in the Analytics. Indeed, one has scientific knowledge when one has a 
conviction of  a given kind, i.e., when the principles are known to him. For, if  the 
principles were not more known to him than the conclusion, he would only have 
knowledge on the basis of  a concomitant factor.” (1139b25-35, my translation). 
Just some lines earlier, T15 could have given the impression that Aristotle was relying on a 
different definition of  scientific knowledge, in which Requirement B would take center stage and 
do all the job, with no reference to Requirement A. However, that is a wrong impression. Now, in 
T16—which continuously follows after T15—Requirement A recovers its central place and 
makes it clear that Aristotle resumes his definition of  scientific knowledge in T1. I will highlight 
four points about T16: (i) Aristotle fully acknowledges the superior authoritativeness of  the 
Analytics for the subject in question, and his acknowledgement makes it clear that his brief  
characterisation of  scientific knowledge in the Nicomachean Ethics only selects some features that 
are important for his concerns in this context; (ii) the characterisation of  scientific knowledge as 
teachable retrieves, even if  indirectly, Requirement A; (iii) the harmony with the definition of  
scientific knowledge in T1 is clear even from some features that are absent in T1 (or in the 
Analytics as a whole) and are highlighted in T16 due to the specific concerns in the Ethics; (iv) the 
 Besides, the verb “passing-away” (φθείρεσθαι) is applied to “middle term” (μέσον) in 74b34. The argument is 70
obscure and hard to decode (cf. Barnes 1993, p. 127-8), but what concerns me is that the verb is applied exactly to 
the term that encodes the explanatory factor (cf. 90a5-14, 75a12-14, 35-37, 76a8-9, 78a31ss.). Whatever is the detail 
of  the discussion in 74b32-39, Aristotle is presupposing that, at least on normal conditions, the middle term, which 
expresses the cause, must be eternal, for, if  it passed away, there would be no scientific knowledge (presumably of  the 
explanandum in question – πρᾶγμα, 74b33, 36). Aristotle might be talking about the object itself  which comes to 
work as middle term (thus, the object itself  must be eternal). But I suggest that Aristotle is talking about that object, 
not in itself, but exactly as the explanatory factor for a given explanandum: the idea is that its explanatory role for that 
explanandum is eternal (no matter if  the object itself  is eternal or not).
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way in which Requirement A is depicted in T16 confirms that the better interpretation of  
Requirement B is in terms of  B5. 
(i) Aristotle’s two explicit references to the Analytics—“as we said in the 
Analytics” (1139b26-27), “all the things we have additionally stated in the Analytics” (1139b32-33)
—but, most of  all, the latter, make it perfectly clear that, for him, the treatise with more authority 
over the subject “scientific knowledge” is not the Nicomachean Ethics, but the Analytics. It is clear 
that the discussion in the Ethics only recalls some features, which turn out to be more important 
for the its concerns, and refers the reader to the Analytics for a more detailed and accurate 
characterisation of  scientific knowledge.  Thus, it should strikes us as surprising and unjustified 71
any exegetical strategy that inverts the situation, I mean, any strategy prone to take the 
characterisation found in the Ethics as a decisive criterion to decipher what is said in the Analytics. 
For it is rather the opposite strategy that should be adopted: it is rather the Analytics that sheds a 
light on the brief  characterisation of  scientific knowledge in the Ethics. 
(ii) In the beginning ot T16, scientific knowledge is characterised as teachable. In order to 
note that this characterisation retrieves Requirement A from T1, an important connection is T9 
(Sophistical Refutations 165b1-3). In T9, Aristotle says that “didactic arguments are those which 
deduce from the principles appropriate to each lesson”. Teaching, for Aristotle—or at least in the 
relevant contexts that concern us here—does not consist in merely transmitting a set of  true 
propositions about a given subject, not even if  that set of  propositions is articulated on the basis 
of  merely deductive (but not explanatory) relations. Teaching, for Aristotle, consists in explaining 
the why, “from the principles appropriate to each thing”. This concept of  teaching does not come 
as a surprise for the careful reader. The same concept is prominent in Metaphysic I.1-2 
(982a12-14, 28-30) and other passages (Rhetorics 1355a26; also, in some degree, Sophistical 
Refutations 184a1-7).  
Besides, the context suggests that, in the sentence “the object of  scientific knowledge is 
learnable”—in Greek, “καὶ τὸ ἐπιστητὸν μαθητόν” (1139b25-26)—the expression “the object of  
scientific knowledge” refers to the explanatory relation between a cause and its pragma. For the 
most important thing in learning is to grasp the causes, as well as the most important thing in 
teaching is to show the explanatory relations. Thus, I submit that, in this context, the expression 
 Something similar occurs in Ethica Eudemia 1222b37-41.71
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“the object of  scientific knowledge” could hardly be taken as referring to the object Moon (taking 
up my previous examples). Indeed, that the Moon exists or that the Moon is the referent of  the 
term “Moon” are not things to be specifically teached and learned through a scientific discipline; 
instead, they are basic facts with which we are already acquainted in pre-scientific stages of  our 
knowledge. But my point in even simpler than that: it is just that it does not make much sense to 
say that “I have learned the Moon”. Similarly, given that teaching involves, precisely, identifying 
the causes of  phenomena which are already encoded in true propositions, it is a natural step to 
infer that the the object of  scientific knowledge (ἐπιστητόν), i.e., that which one learns (τὸ 
μαθητόν) when a teacher teaches us a discipline, also involves, importantly, the explanations that 
identify the causes. What do we learn, after all? We do learn not only that it is true that the Moon 
undergoes the privation of  light identified as an eclipse, but also, and more importantly, that the 
Moon undergoes that privation of  light due to the interposition of  the Earth. Similarly, when we learn 
geometry, we learn not only that the sentence “every triangle has 2R” is a necessary truth; we also 
learn, and more importantly, that every triangle has 2R because the essence of  the items involved is 
such and such (74a25-32ff.). The most important item, in what we learn, is the explanatory 
connection (which, indeed, presupposes and involves the basic propositions related in the 
explanation). 
(iii) The characterisation of  scientific knowledge in the Ethics works with two other features 
(besides being teachable) that are not prominent in the Analytics—first, that scientific knowledge is 
an aptness (ἕξις), i.e., a capacity or competence, consolidated by appropriate training and practice 
(or, if  we prefer the empty and deflated sense that tradition attributes to “ἕξις”, a state of  mind);  72
secondly, that scientific knowledge requires a greater belief  or conviction in the principles on 
which the conclusions depend. Now, the latter feature is found in the Analytics (72a25-b4), but 
watered down among several others, and the fact that T16 selects this feature instead of  others 
can be understood from the specific concerns in the Ethics. For the concern with describing the 
notion of  scientific knowledge in the Ethics is subordinated to the major concern of  characterising 
phronesis as one of  the rational virtues by which we are able to attain the truth (cf. 1139b14-18). In 
Book II of the Ethics, Aristotle has depicted character virtue as an aptness (ἕξις) belonging to the 
 I defended the interpretation of  “hexis” (in the Ethics context) as a capability or competence, consolidated by 72
appropriate training, in Angioni 2009b, p.6-9, and Angioni 2011a, p. 307, 319.
Page  of 42 56
non-rational part of  the soul.  In Book VI, Aristotle keeps the same notion of  aptness (ἕξις) to 73
characterise the rational virtues.  Within such a framework, it is natural for him to say that also 74
scientific knowledge is an aptness (ἕξις)—in this case, a consolidated competence to demonstrate,  75
or, in terms of  T1, to explain a given explanandum through a causal relation that cannot be 
otherwise. Furthermore, the emphasis on an epistemological requirement for scientific knowledge
—namely, the greater conviction in the principles on which demonstrations depend—is also 
natural in the Ethics context. For, given the main interest in highlighting both differences and 
similarities between scientific knowledge and phronesis, it is convenient to highlight the 
epistemological attitudes on which the success of  both those competences depends—that is, the 
success of  scientific knowledge in demonstrating and the success of  phronesis in guiding our 
agency and leading to fully virtuous actions (cf. 1139a17-18ff.). 
Moreover, the way in which this epistemological requirement is treated in the Analytics 
refers, again, to Requirement A. For both having a greater conviction in the principles on which 
depends the conclusion of  a demonstration, and having more knowledge of  them (or knowing 
them more), after all, consist in ascertaining that those principles capture the cause (i.e., the 
appropriate explanatory factor) of  what the conclusion encodes (cf. 72a27-32). It it because the 
principles capture the cause that appropriately explains the conclusion that we can say that we 
have more knowledge of  them (or know them more) and more conviction in them.  76
(iv) Futhermore, the way in which T16 explicitly justifies the epistemological condition just 
mentioned (namely, having a greater conviction about the principles on which conclusions 
depend) also confirms the agreement with T1. At the end of  T16, Aristotle remarks that “if  the 
principles were not more known to someone than the conclusion, one will have knowledge only 
on the basis of  a concomitant factor [κατὰ συμβεβηκός]” (1139b34-35). As I highlighted in my 
remarks at (iii), what makes someone have “more knowledge” of  the principles of  a 
demonstration is the acknowledgement that these principles capture the appropriate cause of  
 In both treatises (for book VI is a common book): Ethica Nicomachea 1103b22, 31; 1104b19; 1106a12, 14, 22; b35; 73
Ethica Eudemia 1218b38; 1219a6, 12, 18, 31-33; 1220b29; 1222a6.
 Cf. 1140a4, 5, 7, 9, 10; 1140b5, 20.74
 Adjectives attached to hexis in 1139a22-23 (cf. 1140a4, 7-10, 20-22; 1140b5, 20-21) refer to the actions and 75
activities for which the hexis in question is an aptness consolidated by exercise and training. Thus, hexis apodeiktike is a 
capacity or aptness to demonstrate, and so on. 
 I argue for this point in Angioni 2012a, p. 37-42. For discussion of  72a37-b4, see Bronstein 2016, p. 35.76
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what the conclusion encodes. Thus, if  someone fails at having more knowledge of  the principles 
than of  the conclusion, it is (according to 72a27-32) because the premises he has selected as 
principles do not capture the appropriate cause. One who fails at having more knowledge of  his 
principles has selected as cause something which, from the explanatory standpoint, is a mere 
concomitant factor that “comes together” with the explanandum without explaining it in the 
most appropriate way. Elsewhere, I have explained in detail that “having knowledge [of  a given 
explanandum] on the basis of  a concomitant factor” (ἐπίστασθαι/ ἐπιστήμη κατὰ συμβεβηκός) 
means, in the appropriate contexts (such as T1, T16 and 76a4-6, connected to T5), explaining a 
given explanandum on the basis of  a given feature that, even being necessarily true of  the subject 
in question (or even being essential to the subject in question), does not capture what is most 
important to explain the explanandum in the most appropriate way and, from an explanatory 
standpoint, only “accompanies” or “comes together” with the explanandum.  It is precisely this 77
point that is retrieved at the end of  T16. Now, attempting to make sense of  T16 without a careful 
understanding of  the Analytics might lead to wrong interpretations, such as the attempt to 
understand the expression “κατὰ συμβεβηκός” as if  it ranged over the ascription of  knowledge to 
the knowing person. This mistake is made easier by translating “κατὰ συμβεβηκός” as 
“accidentally”. However, in 1139b35—as well as in the relevant occurrences within the APo, like 
71b9, 28, 74b11-12, 76a2, 4, 99a3— “κατὰ συμβεβηκός” is used with causal-explanatory force 
and comments over the explanatory attempt qua explanatory: first, “κατὰ + accusative” has a 
causal-explanatory force in these contexts, and, secondly, “συμβεβηκός” refers to items that, from 
an explanatory standpoint, only come together with (or accompany) the explanandum without 
capturing the most important factor to explain it in the most appropriate way. For these reasons, 
what is exactly encoded in the use of  “κατὰ συμβεβηκός” in these contexts is much better 
translated as “on the basis of  a concomitant factor” or “on the basis of  a concomitant feature”.  
My next passage is previous to T16 in the order of  Aristotle’s text, but it will suit me as the 
last step in my discussion. It reads thus: 
T17: “Consider that the parts [sc. of  the soul] that possess reason are two: one is 
that by which we know the kind of  beings the principles of  which cannot be otherwise; the 
 See Angioni 2016, p. 91-102; Angioni 2012b, p. 209-213; (Angioni 2007, p. 16).77
Page  of 44 56
other part is that by which we know the things that can be otherwise.”  (1139a6-8, my 78
translation and italics). 
The crucial element in this passage consists in the description of  the part of  the soul to 
which belongs scientific knowledge: “that by which we know the kind of  beings the principles of  
which cannot be otherwise” (1139a6-8). Attention: Aristotle has not said “that by which we know 
the kind of  beings that cannot be otherwise”. Aristotle’s phrasing makes it clear that the point he is 
concerned with stressing here is, precisely, that the principles of  those beings cannot be otherwise.  
One can say that those principles cannot be otherwise either because they have an eternal 
and necessary existence (e.g., in the case in which “principles” refers to objects such as god and 
the celestial spheres, cf. “eternal causes” in 1026a17), or because all propositions serving as 
principles in scientific knowledge are necessarily true propositions. This is tantamount to taking 
the Necessity Requirement, in T1 and T17, in terms of  B1 and B2 respectively, as the tradition 
has done. However, there are many troubles with this kind of  interpretation. First, as I have been 
arguing, both options (B1 and B2) are insufficient or even erroneous to characterise scientific 
knowledge. It would be surprising if  Aristotle had selected one of  those options—that the 
propositions are necessary (B2), or that the objects are eternal (B1)—to refer to the notion of  
scientific knowledge. Indeed, one might know the definition of  triangle, and know that it is a 
necessarily true proposition, while ignoring how it explains the attribute 2R of  every triangle.  It 79
would be absurd to say that one in such a cognitive state has scientific knowledge of  the 2R 
theorem and know the scientific principles as principles. Besides, as I have already argued with a 
special focus on T4, if  Requirement B is taken according to option B2, it delivers a thesis that is 
not only false but also embarassing.  
Furthermore, there is an issue about Aristotle’s motivation for having said exactly what he 
has said in T17. Take the domain of  geometry, for instance. Within this domain, all propositions
—including the theorems to be demonstrated—cannot be otherwise, if  the expression “cannot be 
otherwise” is taken in terms of  B2, as equivalent to “being a necessarily true proposition”. Being 
 Reading Bekker’s text. Further ahead, I comment the conjecture in Irwin 1999.78
 See Bronstein 2016, p. 39.79
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so, for what reason would Aristotle select exclusively the principles (instead of  all propositions) as 
bearer of  the predicate “cannot be otherwise”?  80
It is clear that, within the context of  the Ethics, the motivation for saying that the principles 
cannot be otherwise is due to the interest in highlighting that the other part of  the soul, which 
controls agency, deals with things and principles that can be otherwise (cf. Ethica Eudemia 
1222b41-42ss.; Ethica Nicomachea 1112a21ss.). This point is made clear in Irwin’s translation 
(“with the other we study beings whose principles admit of  being otherwise”), which conjectures “τὰ 
ὧν ἐνδέχονται” instead of  the options found in the codices in 1139a8 (cf. Irwin 1999, p. 239). 
But, as I will argue below, the intepretation of  T17 in terms of  B5 allows us to understand 
Aristotle’s motivation in a more satisfactory and coherent way.  
But before developing this point, let me address still another trouble. If  T17 is understood 
according to option B2, it results in a strange anatomy of  the rational soul: Aristotle would be 
saying that, on the one hand, one part of  the soul is able to have scientific knowledge of  necessary 
truths (which will include—considering the disciplines as a whole—only mathematics, cosmology 
and theology) but, on the other hand, another part of  the soul is able to have knowledge of  non-
necessary truths—and this will lead Aristotle to heap together in the second part of  the soul items 
so diverse as the biological disciplines and our practical knowledge, for both deal with 
propositions that are true only for the most part. Now, as Irwin remarks about contingent items, 
“in fact not all these states of  affairs are matters of  rational calculation and deliberation, as 
1112a26-b9 makes clear” (Irwin 1999, p. 239). Thus, the division of  the rational soul in T17 
seems to result in an implausible butchering. One might be tempted to avoid this trouble with 
smuggling the ‘for-the-most-part’ truths to the domain of  the first part of  the soul. This is what 
option B2* would do. One might then say that every natural science, strictly speaking, deals with 
“patterns which in individual cases are necessary-unless-something-interferes”.    81
In contrast, the interpretation I propose avoids both the imprecision Irwin has noted and 
the smuggling in the anatomy of  the rational soul. (It has still other exegetical advantages, as I 
will highlight further ahead). First of  all, let us take for granted that Aristotle’s twofold division of  
 See Broadie & Rowe 2002, p. 361: “things whose principles are necessary are themselves necessary”. True. But 80
why does Aristotle put a stress on the principles? Besides: does Aristotle’s main concern range over (i) the necessary 
character of  the things themselves which happen to be principles, (ii) or over the explanatory relation between 
principles and explananda, (iii) or over both?
 Broadie & Rowe 2002, p. 361.81
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the rational soul in T17 seems to be motivated by the concern of  spotting the main differences 
between scientific knowledge and phronesis and, more importantly, by the concern of  highlighting 
what is most characteristic of  phronesis. Now, on options B2 or B2*, the contrast between the two 
parts of  the soul would only highlight the contingency and voluntariness of  actions in a too 
generic way: it is up to a rational agent to do or not to do Φ, etc. Now, I do not deny that 
reminding us about that feature of  rational agency (namely, its contingency due to the openness 
to contraries) can play an important part in Aristotle’s discussion about phronesis (in the large 
context of  T17). My point is that the characterisation of  phronesis as a rational virtue that 
contributes to the full success of  moral action will be stronger and more enlightening, if  other 
features of  it come to be highlighted. Now, I submit that the intepretation of  Requirement B in 
terms of  B5 will furnish us a picture much more enlightening and coherent about phronesis.  
Let φ be a given action, which is in the power of  a given agent to do or not to do. Suppose 
that φ is a virtuous action at least in its external aspects (e.g., an action that an external observer 
can describe with the sentence “she paid her debts”). In order to characterise phronesis and its 
connection with character virtues, one important issue is that there is a series of  different reasons 
why φ can be done: φ can be done by shame (and fear of  bad reputation); by fear of  the penalty 
imposed by law; from calculation of  the material advantages that would ensue its being done; 
because a friend has recommended φ-ing (although the agent has not exactly understood why); 
because the intrinsec moral value of  φ has been fully acknowledged, and so on. Now, all these 
reasons belong to the set of  possible answers to the question: “what is the cause that has led agent 
A to do φ?” Now, consider that, in such a situation, the following statements are true: 
(i) φ is contingent, for the agent can indifferently do or not do φ. 
(i*) the agent’s agency itself—as the cause that makes φ occur—can be said to be 
contingent, in the sense that it can be or indifferently not be the cause that makes φ occur. (In 
other words, A’s agency counts as a contingent principle of  the action). 
(ii) The specific causes (in the domain of  A’s agency) by which φ can occur are many (i.e., 
from my previous examples, shame, fear of  penalty, respect for a friend’s opinion etc.)—in other 
words, φ can be done from a variety of  different principles of  action within the agent. 
Now, the interpretation of  T17 in terms of  B2 (or B2*) captures only the statement (i) and 
its counterpart (i*). However, statement (ii) seems to have more relevance in the context of  T17. It 
is clear that virtuous actions virtuously done requires the right cause within the agent (cf. 
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1105a28-33, 1144a13-20). If  phronesis is a rational virtue that (in some way or another) 
contributes for virtuous actions being virtuously done, it is clear that it contributes in determining 
the correct cause in the agent. Thus, in order to highlight the contribution of  phronesis for this 
achievement (namely, virtuous actions virtuously done), it is much more enlightening to highlight 
statement (ii) than statements (i) and (i*). In other words, it is much more enlightening in this 
context to stress that the principles or causes by which φ can be done are many and multifarious than 
to stress that φ is contingent and that the agent, consequently, is voluntary. Besides, statements (i) 
and (i*) seems to follow from statement (ii), but not vice-versa.  
It is not my aim to go into details in the controversies about phronesis and its role in 
controlling moral character.  However, as some might reject the premise that phronesis contributes 82
in determining the correct cause of  virtuous actions being virtuously done—i.e., one might say 
that phronesis has nothing to do with responding to the right motivation and rejecting the wrong 
ones, like shame, material advantages etc.—I can furnish a different option for taking my central 
point about T17. Let us assume the premise that phronesis, which surely involves an excellence in 
deliberation, contributes to specifying, concretely, what exactly the achievement of  a virtuous 
purpose consists in within a singular circumstance.  Let P be a given moral purpose, which gives 83
a general policy about how the agent must accomplish, virtuously, virtuous actions in each 
appropriate singular circumstance—for instance, let P corresponds to the purpose of  enjoying the 
pleasures of  drinking as I should. Now, there is a big gap between, on the one hand, P (as a general 
purpose) and, on the other hand, a particular action of  the P-type that fully accomplishes what 
was encoded in the purpose P. As we know, this gap is due to the indeterminacy of  several 
relevant factors involved in each singular circumstance. Thus, it is possible for the same moral 
purpose P to end up becoming more specified purposes, P1 and P2, which are very different from 
each other—e.g., in the sense that the “as I should” clause will be fulfilled in very different ways. 
Suppose, thus, that P1 recommeds the agent to drink a little bit more than her usual limit, for the 
sake of  a specific circumstance, whereas P2 recommeds her to drink less than usual, due to 
different complexities of  another circunstances. Given that it is incumbent on phronesis to evaluate 
 My view on these subjects is found in Angioni 2011a. For recent discussions, see Lorenz 2009, Coope 2012; Moss 82
2011 and Moss 2014.
 The ensuing paragraphs presuppose some theses and discussions that can be tracked in Angioni 2011a. The word 83
“purpose” is my option to translate “προαίρεσις”. See Angioni 2011a, p. 310-313.
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the moral importance of  the particular factors involved in each circunstance, it is clear that 
phronesis will have an important role in settling P1 and P2 as more specific purposes suited to 
particular circumstances—and those specific purposes turn out to be principles or causes (cf. 
1139a31) from which concrete actions that satisfatorily instantiate virtuous actions of  type φ 
proceed. 
Now, on either of  the two perspectives depicted above—without going into discussion 
about which of  them (if  any, or both) is preferable as an intepretation of  phronesis and its role in 
virtuous actions—I stress that the relation between principle and action (i.e., action taken as that of  
which the principle is a principle) is not a one-to-one relation. On the contrary. Things are as 
statement (ii) has them (with a small reformulation): 
(ii) The specific causes (in the domain of  A’s agency) by which φ can occur are many (i.e., 
shame, fear of  penalty, respect for a friend’s opinion etc.; or, in the second scenario, P1, P2…Pn)
—in other words, φ can obtain from a variety of  different principles of  action within the agent. 
Thus, the principles of  action can be otherwise not only in the generic sense that they can 
occur or not occur etc., but also, and more importantly, in the sense that they include a wide 
range of  options. In the first scenario, Aristotle would be highlighting that an action φ is such that 
its principles can be multifarious, so that it is incumbent on phronesis to select (or at least to 
contribute in selecting) the correct principle that will deliver the goods, namely, a virtuous action 
virtuously done. In the second scenario, Aristotle would be highlighting that a fully virtuous 
action of  φ-type is such that its principle can be different in a different circumstance, for instance, 
P1 or P2—each of  which will turn out to be appropriate in different circumstances.  
Thus, Aristotle’s motivation to select, specifically, the principles as bearer of  the predicate 
“cannot be otherwise” in T17 turns out to be much more coherent and interesting. What is going 
on in T17 is similar to what is found in T4: the expression “principles”, as subject of  the 
predicate “cannot be otherwise”, refers to those items that are principles (namely, propositions), 
but not taken in themselves independently of  the explanatory role they play as principles of  a 
given explanandum. On the contrary: “principles”, as subject of  the predicate “cannot be 
otherwise” in T17, refers to those items exactly as they play the role of  explanatory principles for a given 
explanandum. In this perspective, saying that the principles cannot be otherwise is far from 
collapsing into the statement that those principles are themselves necessarily true propositions, or 
necessary beings. Even if  those principles are, sometimes, necessarily true propositions (as, 
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indeed, in mathematics), what Aristotle means to encode in T17 is something different—is the 
idea that, for each of  those principles, the explanatory relation between the principle and its 
explanandum cannot be otherwise. Thus—employing “B” for the cause and “AC” for its 
explanandum with predicative structure—what cannot be otherwise is B’s being the cause of  its 
explanandum AC, for instance, the interposition of  the Earth between the Sun and the Moon (B) 
being the cause of  the lunar eclipse (AC). Thus, the principle of  the explanandum lunar eclipse 
cannot be otherwise: it cannot be a different factor.  84
In contrast, the other part of  the rational soul identified in 1139a8 deals with causal-
explanatory relations in which that same description cannot be applied. The principle of  an 
action φ can be otherwise: it can be shame, fear etc. The principle of  a virtuous action virtuously 
done of  φ-type can be otherwise: it can be purpose P1 or purpose P2 etc. To be sure, most of  the 
elemental propositions involved in those causal-explanatory relations are not even themselves 
necessarily true. But this is not the most important point Aristotle highlights in T17. For, in the 
domain of  natural sciences, elemental propositions are themselves true only for the most part (but 
not necessarily), but, even so, the explanatory relations cannot be otherwise. It is only for the most 
part true that sheep have four legs. However, this feature of  sheep is explained by a more basic 
property of  theirs, such as being a blooded animal with such and such characteristics. This 
explanatory relation—between having four legs for the most part and being a blooded animal 
with such and such characteristics—is such that cannot be otherwise. Therefore, the principles on 
the basis of  which sheep have, normally (or for the most part), four legs are such that “they 
cannot be otherwise” within this explanatory relation. Thus, biological sciences can be lodged in 
the same part of  the soul alongside with mathematics—apart from practical knowledge—, with 
no need of  smuggling them.  85
 The same holds for the 2R attribute: the principle of  the explanandum 2R-belonging-to-its-proper-subject (taken 84
as what it exactly is, cf. 75b38, 76a6) cannot be otherwise.
 I am assuming that the kind of  cognition properly attributed to the second part of  the rational soul (the part that 85
deals with contingent things, the principles of  which can be otherwise) is, in the context of  T17, pratical knowledge 
in strict sense: the knowledge that an agent assembles in order to determine what must be done and in order to do it 
in each concrete circumstance. It is important to stress that there is a difference between this practical knowledge 
present in each agent and the philosophical enterprise Aristotle develops in his Ethics. A significant part of the 
content of  both Ethics can perfectly well be taken as belonging to the first part of  the rational soul, together with 
mathematics and natural sciences. At the general level which is enough for the theories developed in the Ethics, the 
explanatory appropriateness of  some principles is not so different from what is found in the natural sciences. For 
discussion, see Karbowski 2019, Henry 2015, p. 177-188. 
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An action φ (i.e., a virtuous action on its external aspects) is something that Aristotle takes to 
be contingent: φ can occur or not occur. Now, φ can be done due to a range of  different principles 
or causes: shame, fear of  penalty, or deep acknowledgement of  its moral value, etc. It is only in 
this last case that φ counts as a full-fledged virtuous action virtuously done. But the important point 
Aristotle makes in T17 is that the relation between φ and the principles that can realize φ is such 
that “the principles can be otherwise”, and it is incumbent on phronesis to select the correct 
principle. A similar story applies in the second scenario I have suggested. The general purpose on 
the basis of  which the agent acknowledges the intrinsic moral value of  actions of  φ-type can also 
be multiplied in a variety of  more specific purposes, each of  them suited to particular 
circumstances (think of  my previous example about specifying the purpose of  enjoying drink 
pleasures as you should). In this way too, the principle of  a virtuous action of  φ-type is such that it 
can be otherwise: different principles (which have been differently specified, as P1 and P2) can 
realise an action of  φ-type in different circumstances. 
Discussions about the voluntariness of  actions highlight statement (i), relying on the thesis 
that actions are themselves contingent items in the world. Discussions about phronesis also rely on 
the voluntariness of  actions, but remotely, inasmuch as phronesis presupposes rational agency in 
general. Now, specific discussions about phronesis as a rational virtue that contributes to virtuous 
actions being virtuously done—as the discussions found in the broader context of  T15-T17—
become much more enlightening if  focused on statement (ii): the principle of  an action φ is such 
that it can be otherwise in the sense that the causal-explanatory relation between actions and the 
principles that realise them is open to a wide range of  options, and phronesis (in either of  the 
scenarios above offered) is required to select or specify, among the wide range of  possible 
principles, the correct one. 
6. Conclusion: 
T17 is in perfect harmony with the definition of  scientific knowledge in T1 when it 
emphasises that the principles of  scientific knowledge cannot be otherwise. The Necessity 
Requirement in T17 must be understood as B5, in terms of  explanatory appropriateness. On this 
point, T17 is not different from any of  the other passages I have considered. For, in all them, 
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Aristotle’s reference to his notion of  scientific knowledge proves to be in complete harmony with 
his definition in T1.  
Barnes (1993, p. 92) has suggested that the definition of  scientific knowledge in T1 was the 
result of  an unhappy juxtaposition of  two disconnected parts.  On Barnes’s suggestion, Aristotle 86
would have arrived at Requirement A from observing the importance of  explanation in natural 
sciences, and at Requirement B from observing the importance of  necessity in mathematics—
and would have erroneously lumped them together in a single universal definition for scientific 
knowledge. Now, from the examination of  the passages selected in this paper, I hope to have 
shown that, on the contrary, the definition of  scientific knowledge in T1 is coherent: it starts with 
the Explanatory Requirement and moves to a more fine-grained specification about the causal-
explanatory relation to be captured.  87
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Warning about the translation: 
I have decided to translate the original paper into English to reach more readers. I have avoided significant alterations 
in content. For, although I do believe that the original paper needs many improvements etc., the project of translating it and 
making it available in English is different from the project of revisiting the same subject and revising my former thoughts 
(which is something that I will surely do—actually, I’m already doing it).  
Although I have restrained myself to avoid significant modifications in the original argument, I have adopted very 
different phrasings in some cases. Portuguese and English are very different languages, and sometimes what makes sense in a 
very straightforward way in one language needs to be expanded when translated to the other (or, inversely, what was expressed 
with more complication in one language can be simplified in the other).  
Since this translation has not undergone any professional proof-reading, I ask my reader to be more tolerant with typos 
and mistakes I have probably left unnoticed. 
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